



John M. Yoder
Dec 1950
copy

FREE
THOUGHTS
CONCERNING
SOULS:

In Four Essays:

- I. Of the Humane Soul consider'd in its own Nature.
- II. Of the Humane Soul compared with the Souls of Brutes.
- III. Of the supposed Præ-existent State of Souls.
- IV. Of the Future States of Souls.

To which is added,
AN ESSAY on CREATION.

By the AUTHOR of *the Impartial Inquiry*, &c.

Quòd si in hoc erro, quòd Animos Hominum immortales esse credam; libentè erro: Nec mihi hunc Errorem, quò delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo: Sin Mortuus (ut quidam *Minuti Philosophi* censent) nihil sentiam; non vereor, nè hunc Errorem meum mortui Philosophi irrideant. *Cicero.*

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T H E

P R E F A C E.



MODEST Freedom of Enquiry cannot be condemned by any Good Man, or True Protestant. For as the Field of Knowledge is naturally common for every Man, so 'tis owing to the Reformation that all unnatural Inclosures have been broken down and removed.

I F an Enquiry into the Structure of the Bodics of the meanest Insects may be deem'd worthy the Attention of the Gravest Philosophers, the Study of the Nature of Souls must certainly be an Employment as much more worthy as the Subject is both more Noble and of greater Importance. But tho' the Anatomy of Bodies (both simple and comparative) hath been well studied and improved of late Years, yet the Anatomy (if I may so speak) of Souls, especially that which is Comparative, hath been less regarded; and when attempted, the Success has been less remarkable.

AS to what concerns the Success of the following Essays, it must be left to the Judgment of Others: But it may be expected that I should give some Account of the Nature of the Performance.

THE Method I follow is what is call'd the Analytical; which as it is the only Method of discovering Truth, so if well attended to, it is the fittest to communicate it to others. For by this Method

THE PREFACE.

thod the Readers are, as it were, led by the Hand, and acquainted with every Step that is taken from the Beginning to the End of the Pursuit.

WHEN Both the opposite Ways seem too much beset with Difficulties, I endeavour to search out a Middle Way. For tho' Men are generally inclined to Extremes, both in Principles and Practice, yet I cannot help thinking not only that the Middle Way is the Way of Virtue, but likewise that it is commonly the Way of Truth.

NEXT to Error itself, I study to avoid Dogmatizing, or deciding too positively concerning Matters not clearly proved.

TO the Essays concerning Souls I have added another on Creation; partly because Creation is frequently mention'd in those Essays, and partly because some former Essays have furnish'd certain Hints not impertinent to that Subject.

THE

THE Whole is dedicated to Religion and Virtue, and offer'd to the Consideration of the Curious and Impartial by

Their Humble Servant,

S. COLLIBER.



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ERRATA.

Page 25. l. 14. for *Internal ation*, read *Internal Sensation*.
p. 83. l. 26. r. is usually found. p. 130. l. ult. dele *we*;
p. 157. l. 30. *much* ought to begin a Sentence.



Free Thoughts
 CONCERNING
 S O U L S.

The First Essay.

*Of the Humane Soul considered in its
 own Nature.*

SECT. I.



Y the Word $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ or *Soul*, ESSAY
 the Ancient *Greeks* meant I.
 any Internal Vital Prin-
 ciple, either of Growth,
 Sense or Action. This
 gave Occasion to *Aristotle* to speak of
 Three distinct Souls in Man: *Viz.* a
 Vegetative, a Sensitive and a Ratio-
 nal Soul; the first a Principle of
 Growth, the second of Sense, and
 the third of Intellectual Action.

B

That

ESSAY That there is a Vital Principle of

I. Growth in Man, which some still
 ~~~~~ call by the Name of a *Vegetative Soul*,  
 and which may be compared with  
 the Principle of Vegetation or Growth  
 in Plants, is allow'd on all Hands.  
 'Tis likewise generally allowed, that  
 this Vegetative Principle, called a  
 Soul, is neither Rational nor Sensitive,  
 and that it is no other than the more  
 refined and spirituous Particles of the  
 Body itself (commonly known by  
 the Name of *Vital Spirits*) which  
 carry on the Circulation of the Blood,  
 on which the Life and Growth of our  
 Bodies immediately depend, as do the  
 Life and Growth of Plants on the  
 Motion of the Sap.

But *Aristotle* seems to have been  
 the first who ever dreamt that the  
*Sensitive Soul* in Man was distinct  
 from the Rational.

To shew that this Distinction be-  
 tween the Sensitive and the Rational  
 Soul in Man is without Foundation,  
 it might be sufficient to observe, that  
 we are conscious but of One Percep-  
 tive Principle within us: But if we  
 desire a further Proof, it will be ne-  
 cessary to consider our various Man-  
 ners of Thinking, together with the  
 Faculties or Powers from which they  
 proceed:

proceed: Which will not only de-ESSAY  
termine this Affair, but serve as a fit I.  
Introduction to the following Essays. ~~~~~

By *Thinking* or *Thought* (in a large Sense) I understand *Any Internal Act, of which we are immediately Conscious, with Regard to Objects.*

If we reflect, we may observe in our selves Two principal Modes or Manners of Thinking, each of which is capable of its particular Modes and Differences. The first is Sensation or Perception (which is Thinking in the strict Sense) The second is Volition or Willing.

*Sensation* is either Simple or Comparative.

1. Simple, or Single Sensation, is, either the Perception of our own Existence, or of any Internal Action or Passion (which Perception renders us, as it were, the Objects of our own Thought, by a sort of Reflection) or else it is our Perception of any Impression or Idea (or Notion) derived from external Objects. In both these Sorts of Simple Sensation (*viz.* External and Internal) our Action is *Attention* either to a single Impression or Idea: Which Action is like turning and fixing the Eye on a single Object.

ESSAY 2. Comparative or Compound Sensation, is, the Perception of the

I. Agreement or Disagreement of divers Ideas, arising from Comparison. Under Comparative Sensation are comprehended *Intuition* and *Reasoning*: The first of which is our Attention to the Agreement or Disagreement of Two Ideas; the second is our Attention to the Agreement or Disagreement of Three or More; as will be shewn.

All these various Sorts of Sensation may very well proceed from one and the same *Sensitive* or Perceptive Faculty, according as it variously fixes our Attention either on One or More Impressions or Ideas.

The other principal Mode or Manner of Thinking is *Volition* or *Willing*, proceeding from the *Volitive* Faculty; which shall be treated of in the proper Place.

There is yet a Third Faculty or Power of the Human Soul, *viz.* the *Executive*. But this some confound with the Will or Volitive Faculty; notwithstanding that their Notions are as different as those of Commanding and Obeying.

From these Remarks it appears, That *Reasoning* (which is the Noblest Degree



Degree of *Thought* in Us) is it self ESSAY  
 but a more Perfect Degree of *Sensation* or Perception; and likewise that 1.  
 even *External Sensation* (which is the  
 Lowest Degree of Sensation or Per-  
 ception) is no less than Thought, tho'  
 it includes a less Perfect Act of At-  
 tention.

But if Reasoning, or the Noblest Degree of Thought in Us, is but a more Perfect Degree of *Sensation*, and if even *External Sensation*, which is the lowest Degree of Sensation, is *Thought*, we ought to conclude, that where External Sensation is found together with Reasoning (as in Man) they Both proceed from the same Thinking Principle, and consequently, that the very same Thinking Principle (or Soul) is both Sensitive and *Rational*: For as one Thinking Perceptive Principle is sufficient for Both, 'tis unreasonable to suppose More than One.

## S E C T. II.

But what is this Thinking Principle which is properly called the Human Soul? Is it only a single Particle, or is it a Composition, or the Result of a Composition, of the more refined Particles of the Body? Or else is it Something Essentially

ESSAY ally Distinct from and Independent of  
I. the Body.

These are Queries that have long exercised the Free Thoughts of the Curious. And as the Scriptures decide nothing about them, but leave them (as they do other Points of Philosophy) to the Discussion of Reason, the same Freedom of Thinking must be allowed to be still the Right of every Man?

Nor have past Enquiries struck such a Light as may be pretended to render all farther Enquiries unnecessary. For the Antients (particularly the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians*) from whom the *Greeks* received the Doctrine of the Natural Immortality of the Human Soul and its Essential Distinction from the Body, seem to have done little in the way of Reasoning. Their chief Care was (not to improve but) only to preserve certain Traditional Unproved Opinions, and to hand them down to Posterity. And even when the Philosophers of *Greece* began to reason upon the mentioned Doctrine after their free manner, and to enquire into the Nature and Substance of the Soul, the Variety of their Opinions, and the Loudness of their Disputes proclaim'd their  
their

their little Success. Some doubted of its Immortality, and some as stiffly denied as others zealously defended it. The *Epicureans* and *Démocriticks* held that it would be dissolved, and reduced to insensible Atoms at Death. The *Stoicks* contended that it would, at last, lose its Individuation, and return into the Common Soul of the World, of which it was a Part. And the *Pyrrhonists* (unsettled by these and other Disputes) profess'd themselves to doubt not only of its Immortality, but of every thing else. The Case continues much the same, and we have still our *Epicureans*, *Stoicks* and *Pyrrhonists*, tho' under other Names.

### SECT. III.

But without amusing ourselves with the Opinions of others, let us attend to the Dictates of Reason, grounded on our own Experience and Observation.

If we consult our Experience, we shall, as was said, observe in ourselves divers Sorts and Degrees of Thinking or Thought. Whoever therefore undertakes to prove that the Thinking Principle within us is Something Essentially distinct from the Humane Body, may do well to enquire, in the first

ESSAY first place, whether the Body is con-

I. cern'd in any sort or degree of Thinking.

That the Brain is the Seat of Sensation (which we have observ'd to be one sort of Thinking) is at present universally agreed. Sensation seems indeed to be diffused throughout all Parts of the Body : But it has been demonstrated by Learned Anatomists to be no where, in reality, but in the Brain ; to which the Sensible Impressions made either on the External or Internal Parts of the Body, are as it were convey'd by means of the Nerves : For where there is no Nerve there is no Sensation of Impressions from Objects.

The Seat of the Humane Soul or that Thinking Principle within us (whatever it is) must therefore be in that Part of the Brain where the Nerves from all Parts of the Body meet as in their Common Center ; which Part is usually call'd the *Common Sensorie*, and is observ'd by Dr. Willis to be near the beginning of the *Medulla Oblongata* in the *Corpus Striatum*.

That the Cavities or hollow Spaces of this Part of the Brain abound with plenty of the finest and most volatile  
Spirits



Spirits which are separated by means of certain Vessels from the Blood, and which, tho' call'd Spirits, are really parts of the Body, not unlike the purest Invisible Spirits of Wine, and consisting like these Spirits, of a Swarm of innumerable loose Particles, or very small Parts, is most certain. This is clearly proved from the Dizziness we sometimes feel, when every thing about us seems to turn round; which can proceed from nothing else, but the whirling Motion of the mention'd Spirits. 'Tis likewise proved from the Heat we are sensible of while our Thoughts are busily employ'd, and from the Faintness which follows long and intense Thinking; both which must be concluded to proceed from the violent Agitation and Expence of these Spirits.

From these Observations 'tis evident, that if any Part or Particle of the Body is qualified to be the Soul or Principle of Thinking, it must have its Seat among these Spirits of the Brain (which are commonly call'd *Animal Spirits*) for as much as they are certainly concern'd in Thinking. 'Tis likewise clear from Reason, that if the Thinking Principle within us is not a Being Essentially distinct from

ESSAY our Bodies, it must be either a single

I. Particle in the Brain, or else it must be  
~~~~~ a Composition or the Result of a Composition of divers Particles : Meaning by Particles those Original least Parts of which Bodies are compos'd, and to which they may be reduc'd by Natural Means.

That the Humane Soul, or the Thinking Principle within us, is not a single Particle in the Brain, may, it's conceiv'd, be clearly inferr'd from the Incapacity of a single Particle to receive at once so great Variety of Sensations as is receiv'd by the Humane Soul. For as the Thinking Principle within us, (if a single Particle) cannot receive Sensations immediately from the Objects of Sense, 'tis clear that it can receive them no otherwise than by means of Impressions from some Particles of the Spirits of the Brain acting upon it; the Numbers of which Particles must, by Consequence, bear some Proportion to the vast Variety of Objects that are at once perceiv'd. But if all the single Particles of which Bodies consist are either of Equal or nearly Equal Bulk, 'tis impossible any one of them should at once receive such Variety of Sensations from the Impressions of the other Particles.

But

But how doth it appear, that the single Particles of which Bodies consist are either Equal or nearly Equal in Bulk? This Query will, it's conceived, be fully satisfied by the following Remarks:

ESSAY
I.
~~~~~

1. No Corporealist, at least, has a Right to suppose any Inequality of Bulk among the single Particles of Bodies. For since he supposes them to be Eternal, and by Consequence, equally necessary with respect to Existence or Being, he ought likewise to suppose them Equal in all other respects: For as much as being of the same Nature, an equal Necessity of Existence could not be the Foundation of any Inequality among them, but quite the Reverse.

2. No Man whatsoever has the least Ground to suppose any Inequality of Bulk among the single Particles of which Bodies consist; for there is nothing in Nature to found such a Supposition upon. We see that even the grossest parts of Bodies are reducible to very minute parts, which parts are found to consist of a prodigious Variety of Parts much more Minute, which yet cannot be said to be the Single or Original Particles of which they consist. For no Microscope, tho' it

ESSAY might magnify to an hundred thousand times and more, could ever yet  
 I. certainly discover to the acutest Eye the proper Bulk and Figure of any two of the Single Particles: Much less could it discover any Inequality between them.

3. 'Tis very unphilosophical to suppose any Inequality of Bulk or Difference of Figure among the single Particles of Bodies; because it is a Supposition both Unnecessary, and contrary to Experience? 'Tis Unnecessary; because all the Sensible Appearances, and Mechanical Operations of Nature may as conveniently be accounted for on Supposition of the strict Union and various Configuration of Equal Particles, as on Supposition of Particles originally Unequal or of various Figures. 'Tis likewise contrary to Experience. For the Instruments of Nature's Operations are always the most simple: Yet out of Simplicity She produces an almost Infinite Variety. Accordingly the First Principles (or Original Particles) of Bodies, take all Sorts of Forms from Composition, and all Forms are varied by their Separation. So that the Equality of the single or original Particles appears both from their equal Fitness for the  
 Purposes



Purposes of Nature, and likewise from our Experience of the constant Simplicity of the Instruments of Nature's Operations. ESSAY  
I.

But if the single Particles of Bodies are to be supposed of equal Bulk, then no single Particle (tho' capable of Sensation) may be supposed to receive any more than one full sensible Impression on a Side at once. But that one Impression, being likewise made by a single Particle, cannot excite any Variety of Sensations in the other Particle.


To make this plain by an Instance exactly parallel. Our Eyes are capable of receiving Impressions from a vast Number of Objects at once by means of the Rays of Light, because the single Particles which compose the Rays are inconceivably smaller than the Pupils of the Eyes through which they are receiv'd. But supposing each single Particle of the Rays to be of equal Bulk with each of the Pupils, 'tis certain that neither of the Pupils could then receive more than one full or total Impression at a time; which could produce no Variety of Sensation of Visible Objects.

Thus the Case would be in all Sensations of the Soul, if it were a single Particle, even supposing the Sensible Impressions

ESSAY Impressions to be always made by sin-

1. gle Particles But as the Original  
~~~~~ Particles are so extremely minute, and  
so apt to adhere to each other, that
it may be doubted whether any two
of them exist singly or separately in
the Universe, as likewise whether the
most refined Particles of the Animal
Spirits, by which the Impressions must
be conceiv'd to be made, are not Con-
cretions or Compositions of many
smaller Particles; this at least cannot
but render the Impossibility of so
great a Variety of Sensations (if the
Soul be a single Particle of Matter) as
manifest as that a thing cannot be E-
qual to the Whole of which it may
be consider'd as a Part.

But supposing on the contrary, that
there is some Inequality among the O-
riginal Particles of Bodies; supposing
likewise that the more bulky Particles
are sufficiently capable of Sensations;
Volition and Self-motion, and that
those of less Bulk are only qualified to
be the Instruments of their Sensations
and Operations; What real Advantage
would these Suppositions yield to the
Cause of Irreligion? Would not the
more bulky Particles be, in all Essen-
tial Points, the same with what we
are used to call Spiritual Souls? And
might

might not all the Inferences be drawn ESSAY
from thence that can, with Reason, I.
be drawn from the Doctrine of the 
Soul's being Incorporeal; such as its
Invisibilty, natural Indivisibility and
Immortality?


This our Modern Corporealists seem to be aware of; and 'tis partly for this Reason, perhaps, that they seem entirely to have given up the Opinion of the Soul's being a Single Indivisible Particle (or Atom) and to hazard their Cause (with the Ancient *Atomists*) on the Supposition of its being a Composition, or, at least, the Result of a Composition of such Particles.

But that the Human Soul is neither a Composition, nor the Result of a Composition of Particles, may appear from the following Reflections.

First, That the Animal Spirits of the Brain in Composition (or as taken together) cannot be that Thinking Principle which is call'd the Human Soul, is evident. For that Thinking Principle must be Something that is Fix'd, not Volatile and in a perpetual Motion, as are the Animal Spirits: Otherwise our Thoughts would be in a continual Fluctuation and Confusion, and we should not be capable of steadily pursuing any one Design.


Besides

ESSAY Besides this, the Principle of Thinking must be but One Thing, not Innumerable Things, as are the mentioned Spirits: Otherwise our Sensations would be broken and incoherent, and our Consequent Actions less consistent and uniform: Numbers and Motion of Parts are therefore not to be supposed in the Principle of Thinking, or Soul.

I.  Indeed, if we consider the Animal Spirits of the Brain, not as the Soul itself, but as the immediate Instruments of the Soul's Sensations of External Objects, their Motion, in that View, will be so far from appearing to be any Hindrance to Thinking, that it will be found necessary to excite it. For we must still remember, that even External Sensation is Thinking.

But at the same time, it must be considered, that tho' Motion may excite Sensation or Thinking in a Being endued with Thinking Powers, yet in other Beings nothing but Motion, and Change of Form or Figure can be the Result of Motion. For if Thinking should be the Result of Motion in Beings not endued with Thinking Powers, Something would be the Result or Effect of Nothing, or Something would


would spring from that which had ESSAY
Nothing equivalent to it in itself. I.

If it be said, that Colours and 
Sounds are compounded of mere Figure and Motion in the Objects of Sight and Hearing, and yet are different from Figure and Motion; and consequently, that Thinking, though likewise different from Figure and Motion, may result purely from their Composition; I answer, That Colours and Sounds are not in the Objects of Sight and Hearing, any more than Pain is in the Objects of Feeling.

'Tis true, the Figures of the minute parts of Visible Objects, by means of the Motion of the Rays of Light, make Impressions on the Eyes, which by their Communication with the Animal Spirits of the Brain excite a Sensation which is properly what we call *Colour*. The Figure of the Pipe or String, together with the Motion of the Air, occasions, in like manner, the Sensation called *Sound*. And the Figures and Motions of the Particles of Flame excite the Sensation call'd *Pain*. But Colours and Sounds (as was said) are no more in the Objects of Sight and Hearing than Pain is in the Flame which is the Object of Feeling. They are pure Thoughts of the Soul; and was there

ESSAY no Being endued with Thinking Powers, and capable of these Sensations
 I Figure and Motion, however compounded in the Objects, could never excite (much less produce) either *Colour*, or *Sound*, or *Pain*: For mere Composition cannot change the Natures of the Things compounded. The Composition or Mixture of Gold and Copper doth not produce a new Metal, but the compounded Metals are still Gold and Copper, as before: As a Chymist can easily demonstrate by separating them. And tho' the Pipes of an Organ, by Conspiration (which is a Sort of Composition) are said to produce what we call Concordance or Harmony, which no particular Pipe of that Kind can produce, yet even in this Case, nothing happens but what is the result or effect of the Motion of the Air in each of the single Pipes; so that the whole Sett yields no more than what the Figures of the particular Pipes supply, by causing concordant or agreeing Motions in the Air.

From these Remarks it appears, that the utmost that the Composition of the Animal Spirits can produce to the present Purpose, is no more than an Agreement of Figures and Motions
 with

with each other, and likewise that ESSAY
 the Agreement of Figures and Mo- I.
 tions cannot change their Natures or 
 make them different from what they
 were before. But if their Natures
 are not changed by Composition, their
 Composition can produce no Think-
 ing Powers in those Spirits. For if
 Figure without Consciousness pro-
 duces a Power of Sensation, or if Mo-
 tion proceeding from necessary Im-
 pulse produces a Free Power of Elec-
 tion or Choice, then Nothing produces
 Something. For to say that any Causes
 act beyond the Capacities of their Na-
 tures, is to say, that Something is
 done without any Cause at all.

Again, Neither the Animal Spirits,
 nor any other Composition of Parti-
 cles (tho' fix'd and closely united in
 the Brain) can be the Subject of such
 Sensation or Perception, as that of
 the Humane Soul. For as mere Com-
 position doth not change the Na-
 tures of Things, the Particles which
 compose any part of the Brain what-
 soever, cannot but retain their Di-
 stinction and particular Properties,
 notwithstanding the closest Composi-
 tion, as well as if they were at the
 greatest Distance from each other.
 Consequently, 'tis clear that each of

ESSAY the compounded Particles, tho' suppo-

I. fed to be in some Degree Sensitive or
 ~~~~~ Conscious; can be sensible of but a part  
 of an Object. But if this were the Case,  
 there could be no Sensation of any whole  
 Object; for as much as there could be  
 nothing in the Compound capable of  
 uniting and comparing one part of an  
 Object with another, or of reflecting on  
 such Comparison: For Nothing, we  
 all know, can effect Nothing.

Suppose the Parts of a Looking-  
 glass to be endued with Sensitive Pow-  
 ers; suppose it likewise to receive the  
 Rays of any Whole Object; yet since  
 it consists of a vast Number of Parts  
 as really distinct from each other as if  
 at the greatest Distance; it follows,  
 that each minute Part or Particle can  
 perceive but a certain proportionable  
 part of the Object; so that whatever  
 is perceiv'd by any single Particle,  
 the other Particles cannot but be  
 entirely ignorant of. But as the  
 Glass consists of nothing else but  
 those mention'd Particles, it follows,  
 that there is nothing in the Glass  
 that is capable of uniting the sever-  
 al imperfect Perceptions of those  
 Particles, and likewise that therefore  
 there can be no perfect or complete  
 Perception of the Object, such as we  
 are



are conscious of in the Human Soul. ESSAY

From all these Considerations, the I.  
general Conclusion is, that the Human Soul is no constituent Part of the Body, nor any thing resulting from or essentially depending on it; and by Consequence, that it is a Being essentially distinct.


#### S E C T. IV.

If it be still queried, What then is this Thinking Principle or Being which we call the Human Soul, or How is it distinguish'd from the Substance of its Body? This Query cannot be better satisfied than by considering those Properties of our Bodies which we have observ'd to render them incapable of such Sensations as those of our Souls.

We have observ'd, that the Human Body, the Substance of which is usually call'd *Matter*, (because of the same Nature with the Materials which compose the visible Universe) is therefore incapable of such Sensations, because, like all other Compound Bodies, it is made up of extremely minute Particles, unfit to receive such a Variety of sensible Impressions, and naturally distinct from, and separable from each other.

'Tis

ESSAY 'Tis therefore very natural to infer,

1. on the contrary, that the Human Soul  
 is of a Substance that is Simple or Un-  
 compounded, fitted to receive a great  
 Variety of Impressions from sensible  
 Objects,, and not naturally subject to a  
 Separation of Parts.

That the Human Soul must be One  
 Thing, and therefore of a Substance  
 that is simple or uncompounded, and  
 not naturally subject to Separation of  
 Parts, hath been already proved from  
 Reason; and that the Soul is capable  
 not only of acting upon the most sub-  
 tile and refined Particles of the Body  
 (*viz.* the Animal Spirits of the Brain)  
 but likewise of receiving, through  
 their means, a vast Variety of Impres-  
 sions from Objects, is very clear from  
 Experience. But if it be so, 'tis both  
 very natural and reasonable to infer,  
 that Beings which mutually affect  
 each other, are to be supposed to have  
 some general Agreement or Similitude  
 of Natures. 'Tis therefore not unrea-  
 sonable to conclude, that the Human  
 Soul is a Being of a Middle Nature be-  
 tween the Nature of its Body and that  
 of the Deity. For if it be affected  
 by Sensible Objects through the Instru-  
 mentality of the Matter of its Body,  
 this seems to argue it to be of a Sub-  
 stance

stance not wholly different from Mat- ESSAY  
ter; and if it acts on its Body by a I.  
Force inherent in itself (as we are ~~~~~  
conscious it doth) this shews a Sort of  
Power, which, I had almost said, we  
can no more comprehend than we can  
that Power which gave Motion to  
the greatest Bodies of the Universe.

I say, the Human Soul cannot, it  
seems, be of a Substance totally diffe-  
rent from Matter, because it is Passive  
as well as Active. " For, as Mr.  
*Locke* observes \*, " Pure Spirit, viz.  
" GOD, is only Active, pure Matter  
" is only Passive; those Beings that  
" are both Active and Passive, we  
" may judge to partake of both. "

This, at least, is the most natural  
Way of Thinking, and the most agreea-  
ble to the common Sense of Mankind,  
which declares loudly against certain  
Philosophers, who by stripping the  
Soul of every thing that belongs to  
the Idea of Matter, have refined it ei-  
ther into a *Pure Act* without any pro-  
per Agent, or else into a mere Com-  
plication of *Active Powers* without  
any proper Subject.

But however this may be under-  
stood, 'tis sufficient that we have  
proved

\* Essay concerning Human Understanding, Vol.  
I. p. 264.

ESSAY proved the Human Soul is a Being essentially distinct from the Matter of its Body. For tho' we may not be able to form a complete Idea of the Distinction or Agreement between the Soul and Body, yet the Proofs we have produced, from the Nature of Sensation, of the essential Difference between them will, its conceiv'd, be Demonstrations, as long as it shall be true that a Part cannot be equal to the Whole, and that Nothing cannot produce Something.

Nor doth the Sensitive Faculty of the Soul yield the only Proofs of its essential Distinction from its Body, but the other Faculties combine to furnish the like Proofs; as will be shewn.

#### S E C T. V.

That the Human Soul is separable from its Body, is a plain and necessary Consequence of the essential Distinction between them : We may therefore proceed to consider the Circumstances and Manner of its Separation.

The Soul being of a Substance that is Simple or Uncompounded, cannot, as we observ'd, be naturally subject to a Separation of Parts. But this  
is



is so far from disqualifying it for a Separation from the Body, which is no Part of it, that it rather assists us to explain the manner of it. For if this

ESSAY  
I.

be so, 'tis certain in the first place, that the Soul must remain entire even after the Death of its Body, and must still retain the Powers and Properties which it before possess'd independently of the Body, unless depriv'd of them by some superiour Power. And therefore there can be no reasonable Doubt of its retaining its *Internal* of its own Particular Existence and Action, at least, according to the natural Course of Things.


And as for its *External Sensations* (tho' depending, at present, on the Body) yet if we carefully enquire into the Nature of them, we shall, perhaps, be so far from supposing they can either be lost or impair'd by its Separation from the Body, that we shall see Reason to think they will be more vivid or lively, because more immediately excited by the Objects themselves.

The Soul, while embodied, sees by the means of Images of Visible Objects form'd by the Rays of Light on the Bottoms of the Eyes, and hears by the means of Images (if I may be allow'd

E

the

ESSAY the Expression) of the trembling Motions of Sonorous Bodies impress'd by the

I.  Air on the *Tympana* or Drums of the Ears: Which Images affect the Nerves, and by them the Animal Spirits of the Brain, in like manner as the Objects affect or work upon the Particles of the Light or Air. But Sensations excited by Images, must be proportionably more languid and faint, as the Motions and Impressions caus'd by the Images on the Nerves and Animal Spirits are weaker than those caus'd by the Objects themselves on the Rays of Light, or on the Air.

Besides, as the Soul, in a separate State, will probably have, other Sensations to which it is now a perfect Stranger, so 'tis reasonable to think its Sensations will be not only more lively, but more true, or more agreeable to the Natures of Things. At present, no other Sensations are excited in our Souls by the means of External Objects, but such as our *Sensories* are fitted to excite. Things appear not to us naked as they are in themselves, but cloath'd with Qualities foreign to their Natures. What at present excites the Sensation of Red, or Yellow, or any other Colour, will when we have a true Sensation, appear to be a very different


different thing: As is clear from the very different Appearances of Bodies when view'd through a Microscope. Therefore such who imagine that separate Souls must sleep, or remain in a State of Inactivity, for want of organized Bodies to perceive and act in, appear to do little more than dream.

Neither do the Sensories (*viz.* the Eye, the Ear, &c.) diversify Sensations, or cause Seeing and Hearing and the other external Sensations, to be properly what they are, and distinguish them from each other; as some are apt to imagine. For 'tis reasonable to think that the Sensation excited more immediately by Visible Objects will be Seeing, as well as the Sensation which is now excited in us by means of the Images of those Objects: And so of the rest. At least External Sensation (which indeed is properly nothing else but Feeling) will always differ according to the different Impressions from Objects.

But if the Soul will be capable of the same or the like Sensations, it will doubtless be capable of the same or the like Joy and Grief, Desire and Aversion, Hope and Fear, and the

ESSAY other Affections which naturally follow Sensations.

I



And as the Soul, in Case of its Separation from the Body, will be capable of the same or the like Sensations and of the Affections or Passions which result from them, it cannot but be most reasonable (as was observ'd) to conclude, it will still be endued with all its other Properties and Powers which it possesses independently of its Body. Consequently, since in its present State of Union it is capable, by moving the Spirits of the Brain, to move its Body (tho' loaded with other Bodies) as quick as Thought, it cannot be unreasonable to think it will still have a proportionable Power of moving both that and other Bodies at the time of its Separation: For we are conscious that this motive Power is a Power independent of the Body. But if so, we need not doubt of its Power to move itself, both at, and after its mention'd Separation. For being still as capable of perceiving, willing and executing as ever, it can, by Consequence, determine itself, at least, as readily as it now doth its Body, to any particular Motion or Operation; and having the mention'd Power of moving Bodies, it may be suppos'd



supposed to be sufficiently free from ESSAY  
Obstructions and Impediments. I.

It has been usual to go a much greater Length, by asserting that human separate Souls, and all other spiritual or Thinking Beings, are qualified not only to move Bodies, but to penetrate their very Substance or the Matter of which they consist. This proceeded from an Opinion that Soul and Body had nothing common in their Natures; an Opinion contrary to Experience, which shews that the Soul is, even without its Consent, affected or wrought upon by the Matter of its Body; and that it knows Matter, not by penetrating its Substance (as doth the Deity) but by receiving its Impressions.

But some will say, if separate Souls cannot penetrate the Matter of which Bodies consist, but are subject to bodily Impressions, it follows that they must resist and reflect the Rays of Light, and, by Consequence, become Visible.

I answer, This is no necessary Consequence. For there may be a Substance equal to an hundred thousand, or perhaps a million, Particles of Matter, and yet Invisible. For tho' a Microscope may magnify to an hundred

ESSAY dred thousand or a million times, yet

I. it cannot discover the Bulk or Figure  
~~~~~ of the proper Particles of Water and  
other Fluids. There may likewise be
other Causes or Reasons of Invisibi-
lity besides the extreme minuteness of
Things; such as the extreme Swift-
ness of Motion, the Dissipation of the
Rays of Light, and the like.

But is not Solidity (from whence
proceeds Resistibility) a peculiar Pro-
perty of Matter?

I answer, if by Solidity, be meant
Impenetrability by Matter, (as must
be allow'd) then, I conceive, 'tis most
certain that Solidity is no peculiar
Property of Matter. On the contra-
ry, the Substance of the Great Un-
created Being, tho' absolutely Invisi-
ble, is the most transcendently solid,
because absolutely Impenetrable either
by Matter or any other Being: And
thence it is that it penetrates, per-
vades and fills All Things. But this it
doth without any the least Resistance;
for as much as Resistance is only be-
tween Substances of equal or nearly
equal Natures, such as are all created
Substances; which by Consequence
cannot penetrate any Substance.

SECT.

S E C T. VI.

But notwithstanding that the Human Soul, as to its Essence, is independent of its Body and separable from it, yet while embodied it depends in most Cases, by the Will of its Great Creator, on the bodily Members as Organs or Instruments of Sensation and Motion. For we find, it can no more see or move, in the present State, without the Help of the Eye and the other Members, than a Person in a Place of Confinement can directly perceive Visible Objects in the Streets without looking through some Window or other Opening, or walk at Liberty without breaking his Prison.

However, this doth not hinder it from Acting even now, in some respects, independently of its Body, or, at least, above the Capacity of its bodily Sensories and Members. For,

1. It either hath or may have some Conception of the Divine Being, who is no Object of the external Senses, and who inconceivably transcends Matter or Bodies in every Thing that expresses the Perfection of Being.


2. It can form general Ideas from Individuals, tho' Individuals are the only Objects of Sense: And those general

ESSAY neral Ideas it can use as Standards,
 I. wherewith to compare Individuals.

3. It can determine itself to Internal as well as to External Action, and by reflecting on itself and its Actions can acquire and retain general Ideas of Reflection absolutely independent of the external Sensories: Which are infallible Proofs that it has a Sort of Memory inherent in itself.

4. It can improve upon its external Sensations. For Instance, it can have a Conception of the Distance between Objects both of the Sight and Feeling, independently of the Sensories of Sight and Feeling. From hence it proceeds, that a Man who has the Benefit of Sight can perceive one Object to be vastly more remote than another, tho' the Images of those Objects in the Bottoms of his Eyes are of equal Magnitude: In which Case, the Soul corrects the Sense of Seeing. And hence it likewise proceeds that a blind Man, by the Help of two Sticks, touching each other at their Extremities, and bearing against a Wall, can find the Distance of the Wall by the greater Acuteness or Obtuseness of the Angle which they make at the Wall: In which Case, the Soul improves on the Sense of Feeling.

Another

Another Method of its improving ESSAY
 upon the Senses, is, by its inventing I.
 of Instruments, by the means of which 
 it brings remote Objects, as it were,
 nearer, and does, as it were, increase
 the Bulk of lesser Objects, and renders
 them distinctly perceptible.

5. It can make one Sense serve instead of another; As for Instance, by using Letters instead of Words, and Notes instead of inarticulate Sounds: Which is like rendering sonorous Bodies the Objects of Sight; whereas they are naturally the Objects of Hearing.

6. It can correct and improve not only the external Senses, but likewise the Imagination: As in the Case of the seeming absolute Infinity of Extension.

7. It can improve upon the Bulk and Strength of its Body. For tho' the bodily Members are but little and weak, it invents Instruments or Engines, by which it not only can subdue the largest and strongest Animals, but can even break the Rocks, and level the Mountains, drain the Lakes, measure the Heavens, and encompass the whole Earth. This demonstrates the natural Greatness or Excellency of the Human Soul. For tho', at present,

F

sent,

ESSAY sent, confined within the narrow Compass of its Body, yet it shews itself, in
 I. some Sense, equal to the Universal System of Matter.

8. It can disengage itself, in some Cases, from its Attention to the Impressions of sensible Objects: And then it is that it exerts its noblest Acts. Then it is that tho' the bodily Eye is open'd in vain to visible Objects, yet the Intellectual Eye is turn'd towards Beauties of a superiour Nature. Then it is that it takes, as it were, a View of that most Perfect Source of All Things, from whence it sprung; it acquaints itself with its Supreme Happiness, and with the Paths of Virtue that lead to it; and, in effect, it anticipates that Happiness by conversing with Beings of a nobler Class in the most blissful Abodes.

Something of this Nature likewise happens, when its external *Sensories* are, as it were, lock'd up by Sleep. For tho' in our Dreams the Soul seems, for the most part, to be rather Passive than Active, yet sometimes it is observ'd to act with an unusual Vigour. The Transactions of several Months, or perhaps Years, are sometimes epitomiz'd and reduced within the Compass of a single Night. Eloquent

quent Harangues are made, and agree-
 able Conversation is carried on by pro-
 miscuous Company. Pertinent Que-
 stions are put, and smart Replies are
 made: So that our Dreams sometimes
 become the Wonder of our waking
 Thoughts.

ESSAY
 I.

9. It can reason well upon Ideas,
 even when the Imagination is dis-
 turbed. For tho' a distracted Per-
 son sometimes imagine he sees what
 he doth not see, or is where he is
 not; yet at the same time he reasons
 justly upon those false Ideas. Thus,
 for Example, If such a Person fancies
 his House is on fire, when it is not,
 he reasons nevertheless, very justly when
 he infers from thence that he must call
 for Water to quench the Fire.

10. It can act with such Force on
 its Instruments, the Animal Spirits,
 as surpasses the Strength of the Frame
 of its Body; even to the breaking of
 Bones and Sinews. It can likewise op-
 pose, restrain, and sometimes subdue
 the Appetites which spring from its
 Body, and can even destroy its Body
 by an Act of its Will.

These Instances demonstrate that
 the Human Soul is, in its own Na-
 ture, independent of its Body, and
 that if, in some Cases, it depends on its

ESSAY Body, 'tis only by the Will of its Creator;
I. as before was said.



SECT. VII.

But to proceed to a more particular Enquiry into the wonderful Actions and Powers of the Human Soul.

The first of its Actions which offers itself to our Consideration, is, its *Attention* to the Impressions of sensible Objects; from whence results *External Sensation*. This Sensation it acquires by means of the external *Sensories*, usually call'd the Organs or Instruments of Sensation; which, like so many Windows of the Body, transmit the Images of surrounding Objects.

Tho' it may be doubted, whether our *Sensories* are sufficient to give information of all Sorts of sensible Objects, or whether other *Sensories* may not be enjoy'd by some superiour embodied Souls, capable of supplying them with other Ideas, of which we know no more than a Man born blind or deaf doth of *Colours* or *Sounds*; yet they are ordinarily sufficient for our present Use and Preservation. And not only so, but by means of the Sensations and Ideas excited by their Assistance, and improved by the Help of Telescopes, Microscopes,

croscopes, and the like, we can cultivate an Acquaintance with a considerable Part of the Universe. We can, as it were, penetrate by the *Sight* into very remote Spaces, and delight ourselves with the Prospect of innumerable glorious Objects. We can mutually communicate our Thoughts in all convenient Situations, by the means of what we usually call *Sounds*. We can refresh ourselves with the *Odcours* caus'd by the *Effluvia* of Bodies, even at a considerable Distance. We can relish an agreeable Variety of Food, and distinguish the Impressions of Tangible Objects. And the Ideas derived from our *Sensories* being, as it were, treasured up by the Memory, improved by the Imagination, and corrected and refined by Reason, are so vast a Fund of Knowledge, as cannot but be amazing to any considerate Man.

ESSAY
I.

S E C T. VIII.

The Act of *Attention*, being, as it were inverted, produces *Reflection*; from whence results the *Internal Sensation*. By Reflection the Soul (contrary to the Nature of Matter) turns inward upon itself, and views its own wonderful Properties and Operations.

By

ESSAY By this means it furnishes itself with

I. clearer Ideas of its own noble Powers and Acts of Perceiving and Willing : Which Ideas are very different from the Ideas excited by the *External Sensories*. By this means it discovers a Sort of Creative Power within itself in new-modeling, correcting, abstracting, and otherwise working on the Ideas of sensible Objects. It sees itself, as it were, seated on an Imperial Throne, invested with a Power of acting on its Body, and, by means of its Body, on external Things, and that, usually, without Controul : Which View of itself, cannot but be very agreeable as well as surprizing.

SECT. IX.

On External and Internal Sensation more immediately depend the Acts of *Memory* and *Imagination*.

If we enquire into the Difference between the Acts of Memory and Imagination with regard to the external Objects, we shall perhaps find it to proceed purely from the different Sorts and Degrees of Motion in the Spirits of the Brain : Which Sorts and Degrees of Motion, in either Case, are not always subject to the Government of the Will. For even the more
gentle

gentle Motion of the Spirits, which sometimes excites the Act of Memory call'd Remembrance, as well as the more vigorous Motion, which excites Acts of Imagination, proceeds very often from accidental Causes, not only without our Consent, but against our Inclination.

ESSAY

1.

Aboali, an *Arabian* Philosopher of some Note, having spent much Time and Labour in searching into the Nature of Memory, was at last so amazed and confounded, that he was tempted to deny that there was any such natural Power in Man or any other inferior Being, and to assert, that it was either God or some Dæmon, at least, who excited the Ideas of Things pass'd.


But not to amuse ourselves with such Enthusiastick Philosophy, Memory, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, is no other than the Sensitive Faculty as concerned either in retaining or reviving the Sensations and Ideas or Notions of Things.

We have already observ'd, that the Sensation of internal Objects, and the Ideas and Remembrance, resulting from it, are independent of the Body. But as for the Remembrance of external Things, it depends as well as the

ESSAY the first Sensations of them, on the Instrumentality of the Brain. This may appear from the manner of our Sensations of external Objects, which seems to be this:

External Objects making Impressions on the *Sensories*, either immediately, or else by means of the Light the Air, or of certain *Effluvia* or Reeks of subtile Particles proceeding from themselves, form by those Impressions certain Figures or Images of themselves in the *Sensories* (as is plainly to be seen in the Bottoms of the Eyes) and at the same time, move by means of these Impressions and Images, the Animal Spirits in the Nerves. These Spirits communicating a like Motion to some of the Animal Spirits in the Cavities or hollow Spaces of the Brain, may form by their means some very minute Images or Signatures (as so many Copies from Originals) on the soft interior Surface of those Cavities; which Images or Signatures (tho' undiscernable to the Eye) by reflecting the Spirits towards the Seat of the Soul, may excite the Sensitive Faculty to attend to and perceive them.

Now, if the Motions of the reflected Spirits, occasion'd by those secondary

condary Images, are the immediate Oc- ESSAY
 casions of exciting the first Sensations I.
 and Ideas of the Soul, the same Motions 
 continued between the Seat of the
 Soul and those Images, must be the
 Occasions of retaining them.

As for the Soul's Sensations of the
 suppos'd Images in the Brain they can, it
 seems, be no other than various Sorts of
 Feeling. If therefore the Soul is willing
 to revive its Ideas (or renew its Sen-
 sations of Objects) it may be conceiv-
 ed to do it by moving the Spirits in
 streight Lines towards those Images;
 by which means it may perceive or
 distinguish their several Properties, so
 as we distinguish the Inequalities in
 the Surfaces of Bodies, and the vari-
 ous Figures they compose by the means
 of a Staff or some other Instrument;
 but in a manner far more refined and
 perfect.

But if the suppos'd Images in the
 Brain become defac'd or erased, then
 must the Soul's Ideas of the Objects they
 represented be either impair'd or ex-
 tinct; or, as we express it, the Memory
 of the Objects must be either in some
 Degree worn out or else quite lost.

Whether this be in all respects so or
 not (for there are some considerable
 Difficulties) 'tis certain, that both the
G retaining

ESSAY retaining and reviving of such Sensations

I. ons and Ideas depend some way or other
 ~~~~~ on the Brain. For we find that the particular Remembrance of external Objects is sometimes either entirely lost or very much impair'd by a Wound or Blow on the Head, or by some other Accident affecting the Brain. Which shews, that the Ideas of those Objects are not fix'd in the Soul.

This Observation, that the Ideas of external Objects are not fix'd or inherent in the Soul, is a strong Proof that a particular Remembrance of those Objects is not to be supposed in the separate State, but that it depends entirely on a Body, as doth likewise *Imagination*, as far as it relates to those Objects.

#### S E C T. X.

On the Acts of *Memory* depend those of *Imagination*. By this I understand the *Sensitive Faculty as concerned either in abstracting or compounding Ideas*.

'Tis by the means of *Imagination* that the Ideas or Notions of Things are diversify'd. It shews that the Soul is not obliged always to think of Things in the same Order as the Ideas of them were at first excited; but that it can, by  
 the



the free Exercise of a Power inherent in itself, either separate the Ideas of Things that are most closely united, or unite the Ideas of Things that are at the greatest Distance of Time and Place; and that it in so doing can ascend above the Distinctions of Time and Place: Which is certainly a great Prerogative of the Soul, while united to a Body which is ever confined to both.

The surprizing Force of the Spirits which excite the Acts of *Imagination*, appears in Three Instances.

One Instance is their representing in our Sleep regular Scenes, and even Landscips of the Places we have been acquainted with, and sometimes leading us by means of those Representations over Rocks, Bridges and other Places of difficult and dangerous Access, as securely as if awake.

Another Instance, is, their representing Ideas so lively as to beget an Opinion in the Persons affected, even when awake, that they are excited by the actual Presence of real Objects: As happens frequently in the Cases of Fevers, Extasies and other Disorders of the Brain. Which Force of Imagination, as 'tis call'd, has been magnified by some Men of Letters to such a Degree, that one would think

ESSAY they supposed it to be a Sort of Divine

I. Power. For they have thought it, in the mention'd Cases, to have a real Effect on the external Air, by changing it into all Forms; so as that even others, whose Imaginations were not so extraordinarily employ'd, might perceive the Forms it caus'd. But this was, in effect, to suppose a greater Power in the Soul while embodied, than is, perhaps, necessary to be ascribed to it even in the separate State.

A third Instance of the Force of the Spirits which excite the Acts of Imagination is said to be their forming Signatures or visible Marks on the Bodies of Infants in the Womb.

As for the two first Instances, they may be sufficiently explain'd by the great Plenty and vigorous Motions of the Animal Spirits in the Brain, bearing against the supposed Images of Objects

And as for the last, if it be really Fact, that the Spirits of the Brain, by their Communication with the other Spirits diffused throughout the Body of the Mother, can imprint Signatures on the Substance of the *Fœtus*, it teaches us the more easily to apprehend how the Motions of the same Spirits may (as was said before) imprint

print the Images or Marks of external Objects on the soft and yielding Substance of the Brain.

ESSAY  
I.

# S E C T. XI.

After Imagination follow the two Sorts of *Comparative Sensation*, viz. the *Intuitive* and the *Rational*. The former is the *Attention* to and Sensation of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, resulting from immediate Comparison. The latter is likewise a Sensation of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, but it results from *Intermediate Comparison*. The manner of *Rational Sensation* seems to be this: The Volitive Faculty, or Will, determines the Sensitive Faculty to attend to or view, as it were, the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; which because they sometimes cannot be brought so together and so placed in the same View as to admit of Immediate Comparison, therefore their Agreement or Disagreement, must be discern'd or perceiv'd by comparing them with some intermediate (or middle) Idea, or Ideas as a common Measure.

By this Account it plainly appears that (as we hinted elsewhere) Reasoning as well as Intuition, is properly but

ESSAY a more perfect Sort of Sensation, and

I. that Reason is not a distinct Faculty from the Sensitive and Volitive Faculties. Yet because it is usual to treat of it (as likewise of *Memory*, *Imagination*, &c.) under the Notion of a distinct Faculty, therefore to avoid Obscurity and Singularity, we shall choose sometimes to submit to Custom.

According to this Account, it likewise appears, that *Sagacity*, *Judgment* and *Understanding*, being all of them Acts of *Attention*, included in the Notion of Reasoning, are not to be consider'd as distinct Powers or Faculties, tho' we may sometimes speak of them as such.

These Observations, which reduce all the Acts of the Soul to three Powers or Faculties, *viz.* the *Perceptive*, *Volitive* and *Executive*; and which demonstrate that *Memory*, *Imagination*, *Intuition*, *Sagacity*, *Judgment* and *Understanding* (which are Ideas either included in or connected with the Idea of Reasoning) and even *Reason* itself, are no Powers or Faculties; but only the same Sensitive Faculty diversly consider'd may be of Use to explain, what has been humbly proposed concerning the Doctrine

trine of the Ever-blessed TRINITY in ESSAY  
a former Treatise \*. 1.

'Tis something odd that certain People should unite with so much Zeal to decry that noble Act of the Soul call'd *Reasoning*, when consider'd in the General, who perhaps could not easily bear the least Reflection upon their own Reason and Understanding in Particular. We may observe there are two very different Setts of Men who join in a Sort of Confederacy to combat *Reason* with its own Weapons. Some seem to have a Design to oblige it to give place to an *Implicit Faith*; and others, under Pretence of mortifying human Vanity, appears to have enter'd into a Conspiracy against human Nature itself, with Design to sink themselves below the Condition of some of the more perfect Brutes. *Intuition*, say the former Sort, is vastly superiour to *Reason*. *Instinct*, say the others, is a much surer Guide.

But as for *Intuition* and the Self-evident Knowledge which it produces, tho' if they are universally extended, they are proper only to the Supreme Being (with whom it would be

\* The Christian Religion founded on Reason,  
p. 101.



ESSAY be Impiety for us to compare ourselves)

I. yet (as was observ'd) we are not altogether without them in some particular Cases. The Agreement or Disagreement of the Terms and Ideas of Propositions, call'd first Principles, are known to us intuitively, *i. e.* by immediate Comparifon. But indeed, if we will know the Agreement or Disagreement of the Terms and Ideas of other Propositions, and by Confequence their Truth or Falſity, we muſt deduce them from firſt Principles and from each other by the Help of intermediate Ideas and Terms. Yet, even in this Caſe, the Connection of our Deductions, if right, is known, intuitively or immediately: So that even *Reasoning* is built on intuitive Knowledge. And tho' ſuperiour created Beings are undoubtedly capable of more readily finding the intermediate Ideas which are uſed in *Reasoning*, yet when they make uſe of intermediate Ideas (as they ſometimes muſt do, if their *Intuition* is not univerſal) they then do no more than reaſon.

As for *Instinct* (or the governing Principle of Brutal Action) it appears to riſe no higher than Phantaſy or Imagination, whereas *Reason* (as to its Acts) is both independent of Imagination

nation and superiour to it. 'Tis in-  
dependent of it: Because when the

ESSAY

I.

Acts of Imagination are disorder'd,  
those of Reason (as we elsewhere ob-  
serv'd) continue sound and vigorous.  
And 'tis superiour to it, because it  
corrects it, as was likewise observ'd:  
Besides, *Reason* sometimes shews its  
Superiority by making use of Imagina-  
tion as its Instrument. By Imagina-  
tion, as by a Prospective-glass, Reason  
(or rather the Soul in Reasoning) sur-  
veys Worlds in some of those seeming-  
ly little Sparks of Light, which we  
are apt to think were design'd only to  
guild the Skies. It views the happy  
Abodes of superiour Beings, and de-  
lights itself with Forms more glorious  
than those of any particular Object of  
Sight. In short, it discovers Moun-  
tains in a single Grain of Sand, and  
an Ocean in the least Drop of Water:  
Which are Operations far superiour  
to an Act of simple Imagination. *Rea-  
son* therefore, in most Cases, surpasses  
Imagination and Instinct; and tho'  
Instinct, in some few Cases, is a more  
ready Help, yet it is never a more  
perfect Guide than Reason is capable  
of being. But of this we shall treat  
more at large in the *Second Essay*.

H

To

ESSAY To conclude this Section. As the

I. Capacity of Knowing and Remembering, is natural to the Human Soul, and Ignorance and Forgetfulness proceed merely from the want of Ideas, so the Capacity of Reasoning is likewise natural to it, and not absolutely dependent on the Matter or Structure of its Body. For tho', on Occasion of Blows or Wounds in the Head, there has sometimes seem'd to be a total Extinction of Reason as well as of Memory, because the Ideas depending on the Brain being obscur'd or disorder'd, the Soul could not, as usual, attend to the Work of Reasoning, which consists in very nicely comparing Ideas; yet the Capacity of Reasoning, we may be assur'd, was not extinguish'd in the Soul, any more than in the Case of Dreaming, when Imagination sometimes usurps the Place of Reason.

## SECT. XII.

Another noble Act of the Human Soul, is, *Volition*, proceeding from the *Will* or *volitive Power*.

That Men have an internal Motive to Action, which renders them in most Cases, capable of determining and exerting themselves in different Manners, tho' in the same or the like Circumstances

Circumstances (and not as the Spring of a Watch or Clock, which in the same Circumstances always exerts itself in the same Manner) was formerly thought to be so clear a Case, that even the *Stoicks* asserted it, tho' in other Respects *Fatalists*. ESSAY I.

The Reality of such a free internal Principle of Action appears, first, from the Consciousness or inward Sensation that we have of it. It is likewise plainly seen in our equal Ability of choosing any one of two or more Objects of apparently equal Value : In which Case, nothing but the pure Resolution of the Mind can turn the Scale. It is also sometimes experimented, with regard to Matter of little Consequence, in our Ability to choose any one of two or more Objects of known unequal Value, without knowing ourselves to be influenced by any Motive but what is purely internal. For, to say we are influenced by any external natural Motive which we know nothing of, is certainly wrong ; for as much as nothing, in the ordinary or natural Course of Things, can be a present Motive to us but by exciting in us some Thought, which Thought we cannot but be conscious of, and by Consequence, cannot but have some



ESSAY Idea of the Object by which it was  
I. excited.

These Instances prove clearly, that we have likewise a Power of Self-termination in other Cases, tho' it is not so usually or readily exerted, because contrary to Reason.

But when our own Sensations both internal and external (or both Consciousness and Experience) concur to assure us of the Reality of a Self-determining or Self-motive Power within us, it must be the utmost Degree of Obstinacy to deny it for no other Reason, than because some Difficulties may be started not easy to be explained. 'Tis well known, there are Difficulties in the Nature of all Motions whatsoever; yet certainly none but an Humourist would with an Air of Seriousness deny there is any such Thing as Motion, in Contradiction to the plain Evidence of his Senses.

This Self-determining or Self-motive Power, yields us a very convincing Proof of the essential Distinction between the Human Soul and its Body; for as much as no particular Part or Portion of Matter, that we certainly know of, has the Liberty of moving itself; but the several Masses of it appear  
to



to be moved necessarily, according to fix'd Laws. And as there is not a Part or Portion of Matter within the Compass of our Observation, but what is moved Necessarily or by a Force impress'd, (not excepting even the Wind and the Light) so there is the greatest Reason to believe the same of all other Matter whatsoever. If therefore any Thing has an inherent Power of determining itself to Motion, free from any such Force, we cannot but have as good Reason to believe it is a Substance essentially distinct from Matter.

## S E C T. XIII.

Lastly, The *Executive Power* or *Faculty*, which immediately produces external Action, depends on the Volitive, and is a Power of whose manner of acting we have no positive Idea. However, negatively, we have sufficient Reason to think, that it is not always by Impressions receiv'd from Objects and again communicated, like the Action of Bodies on each other. For in Consequence of an Act of the Will (which is neither an Impression by Contact, nor the Effect of such an Impression) a Power is exerted on our Bodies, and the Motion of our Bodies follows immediately as quick as Thought,


ESSAY Thought, which manner of acting by  
 I Powers inherent in ourselves, as it is  
 quite different from that of one Body  
 on another, so it is a sufficient Proof  
 that the Principle of such Action with-  
 in us is something essentially diffe-  
 rent from Matter or Body.


Thus we may observe, that all the  
 Faculties of the Human Soul, (*viz.*  
 the *Sensitive*, *Volitive* and *Executive*)  
 yield sufficient Proofs, from the man-  
 ner of their Actions, that the Soul is  
 a Substance essentially different from  
 and independent of its Body; and by  
 Consequence, capable of subsisting and  
 acting without it.

#### SECT. XIV.

But tho' the Human Soul is not es-  
 sentially dependent on its Body, yet  
 since it depends essentially on the Will  
 of its Creator, how can we be assured  
 that it will not be dispoil'd of its Fa-  
 culties or even reduc'd to nothing by  
 that Almighty Power that created it?  
 Tho' it cannot properly die or be dis-  
 solved according to the natural Course  
 of Things, because it is of a Nature  
 that is Simple or Uncompounded; yet  
 its natural Immortality can be no Se-  
 curity against Annihilation.

I answer, That it will not be dis-  
poiled of its Faculties, nor annihilated  
or reduced to Nothing, may be argu-  
ed from that Desire and Hope of Per-  
petuity or perpetual Existence, in Pos-  
session of their natural Faculties, which  
is inseparable from the Nature of Men;  
and likewise, more strongly, from the  
Justice of the Great Author of Nature  
in Governing the World. For as we  
cannot well imagine, in Consistence  
with his most Perfect Wisdom (and  
I had almost said Veracity) that we  
should be created with so universal a  
Bent towards Perpetuity, if not de-  
sign'd for it, so neither can we, in  
Consistence with his most perfect Ju-  
stice, (even though Revelation were  
silent,) believe that the unequal Di-  
stribution of Things in the Present  
State will not be rectified in a Future  
State; which, however, cannot be  
unless we remain in Possession of our  
Faculties. Add to this, that even  
the Particles of Matter of which Bo-  
dies are composed, remain in Being  
after the Dissolution of the Bodies to  
which they belong, and that no Man  
can prove that any one Particle or  
Property of that less noble Substance  
will ever be annihilated or reduced

ESSAY to Nothing : Which shews how little Reason there is to suppose the  
I.  Annihilation of Beings or Properties of far more noble Natures; especially, since such a Supposition may seem to argue Inconstancy and Want of Beneficence; which are inconsistent with the Supreme Perfection of the Great Author of Nature.






## The Second Essay.

*Of the Humane Soul compared with  
the Souls of Brutes.*

### S E C T. I.



SOME Species of Brute ESSAY  
 Animals seem to make II.  
 near Approaches to the  
 Perfection of Human  
 Nature, so there are o-  
 thers which appear to be very little  
 removed from the Nature of Plants.  
 But whatever the Degrees of Perfec-  
 tion may be between some Sorts of  
 those Animals and others; yet if they  
 have Sensations of Objects, in some de-  
 gree, like those of the Human Soul,  
 'tis clear from what has been observ'd,  
 that the very meanest of them are ac-  
 tuated by something above the Power  
 and Capacity of Matter.



ESSAY    Tho' it doth not appear that the  
 II.    Sensitive Faculty in Brutes is capa-  
 ~~~~~ ble of Reflex Acts, or at least, of  
 Forming, by the means of them,
 clear and distinct Ideas of *Internal*
 Objects; yet we can have little Rea-
 son to doubt but they have, many of
 them, very distinct and lively Sensati-
 ons of *external* Objects, or that they even
 excel Men in these respects. A Dog
 by his Smell will single out his Ma-
 ster among Thousands of others, and
 by the same means will find his Home,
 though many Miles off. Vultures
 and Ravens will Scent a dead Carcase
 several Miles. A Hart will hear the
 least Noise, and an Eagle see a very
 minute Object at a great Distance.


And as the external Sensations of
 some Animals are allow'd to be very
 quick and lively, so their *Memories*
 (to speak in the usual Phrase) are ob-
 served to be very tenacious.

But then, it seems, they cannot
 correct the Errors of their Sensations,
 any more than improve their *Sensori-
 es* by artificial Helps. And the Ideas
 they retain or revive are but few;
 and such Ideas as they have, relate
 chiefly to their own Subsistence and
 Preservation, or else to the Propa-
 gation of their respective Kinds. And

as for their other Ideas, they are (as *ESSAY* II. we are used to express it) easily defaced, if not deeply impress'd by Blows or other Severities or Allurements.

But by the wonderful, and, I had almost said, Divine Invention of Speech and Letters, for the Use of which Men are peculiarly framed, our Memories are qualified to be as so many Magazines or Repositories of the Productions of Nature. We carry the Universe, as it were, within ourselves, together with all the Periods of Time, and Distance of Place. So that, retiring into ourselves, we can view not only our own Original, but that of the World. We can become Spectators of the Revolutions of past Ages, and the Policies of the most early and remote Nations. We can, as it were, descend to the Center of the Earth, survey those dark (or at least hidden) Regions, and from thence mount up again to the Surface, take a View of the Varieties it contains, and thence direct our Course towards the Regions of Light, and lose ourselves in those Spaces of which we can never conceive an End. And these our Ideas of Things are oftentimes so lively, that some

ESSAY have been apt to imagine the Soul

II. was present wherever it bent its
 Thoughts.

SECT. II.

Imagination or Phantasie, gives us likewise, in some respects, a considerable Advantage over the most perfect of Brutes. This, when directed by Reason, works in a surprizing manner on the Ideas furnished by Memory, either by abstracting, or compounding them to an almost infinite Variety. By means of this we form general Ideas, which serve as the common Standards of every Species of Beings in the known World, to assist us in the Search of Truth. By this we do, as it were, even create new Worlds, inhabited by Variety of new Species of Beings, and so furnish agreeable Scenes for our Amusement and Diversion. When under close Confinement this doth, as it were, set us at Liberty, it conveys us to the *Elysian* Fields, and places us among the Shades of Heroes. Nay, it even revives for us the famous Men of Antiquity, or else antedates our own Existence, and causes us to live in the first Ages of the World. And such is the Beauty of the Scenes and Images
 which

which Human Imagination presents, ESSAY
that, like some curious Pieces of II.
Painting, they seem to excel even Nature itself; and the Pleasures they give have usually more of Rapture, tho' far less of Solidity, than those that proceed from the Discoveries of Reason. This is the Cause that Men of strong Imaginations, by the Musick of Words added to the Painting of Ideas, have always governed the Multitude, who like Children, were ever taken with gaudy Colours and empty Sounds more than with the solid Substance of Things. And because Imagination was equally vigorous, even when Reason, for want of Cultivation or Improvement, was very weak and languid, thence it proceeded that Superstition made more early Progresses than rational Religion, and extravagant Flights and Paradoxes were of greater Antiquity than solid Arguments: The rather, because Poetry (among the *Greeks* at least) was more ancient than Philosophy, and was look'd upon by the credulous People as the Effect of Divine Inspiration. And even in the present Age, tho' Reason has been cultivated to so great a Degree, Men still suffer themselves to be too much
swayed

ESSAY sway'd by Imagination, partly thro'

II. Indolence or an Aversion to strict Reasoning, and partly through Prejudice and an ungenerous Fear of being thought singular in their Opinions.

Though Imagination cannot furnish such an agreeable Variety to the Brutes as to Men, for want of a sufficient Stock of Ideas, yet in some few particular Cases, the Effects proceeding from it under the Notion of *Instinct*, are very wonderful.

Something has been already said concerning the Competition between Reason in Men and Instinct in Brutes. Instinct is thought to be nothing else but a strong Bent or Bias of the Imagination or Phantasie, necessarily inclining those Animals to perform certain Actions tending to their Preservation and to the propagating of their respective Kinds. But if this be a true Description of Instinct, then those few Actions which proceed from it, how regular soever, can be no Proofs of the superiour Perfection of Brute Animals; because performed necessarily, without either Contrivance or Freedom of Choice. Yet thus it appears to be from Experience.

ence. For tho' Birds build their Nests or Bees their Combs with great Convenience and even Nicety, yet they seem to perform these Actions necessarily in the same invariable manner.

ESSAY
II.

The Productions of Reason, being the Effects of Liberty and Contrivance, are not only almost infinite in Number, but greatly diversified, tho' sometimes tending to the same End. Men are continually inventing new Models of Buildings, while each strives to build either more commodiously or more stately. But the Productions of Instinct in brute Animals of the same Kind are not only few in Number, but invariable and unimproveable: Which sufficiently shews the Imperfection of those Animals, and how little their most regular Actions differ from the regular Motions of some inanimate Bodies.

S E C T. III.

Intuition, (the first Sort of Comparative Sensation) which, as we observed, is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas by immediate Comparison, is a Sensation common to Men and Brutes. For Brutes (as we have Reason to believe)


ESSAY lieve) are able to discern somewhat
 II. of the Agreement or Disagreement
 ~~~~~ of the Ideas of such Things as make  
 Impressions on their *Sensories*. For  
 Example, a Dog, by immediate Com-  
 parison, may perceive that a Man is  
 not a Horse or a Hare.

This we may conceive to be the  
 lowest Degree of Intuition. But as  
 for the Intuition by which the Con-  
 nection of Terms and Propositions  
 is known, 'tis what the Brutes are as  
 incapable of as they are of Speech  
 and Reason. And both these Degrees  
 of Intuition are sufficiently distin-  
 guished from that most perfect Intui-  
 tion whereby the Deity views the Es-  
 sences of all Beings, and from that  
 very extensive Intuition whereby su-  
 perior Created Beings may be sup-  
 posed immediately to view the Truth  
 of Things which are either out of  
 the Sight of Reason, or else not to  
 be discerned by us without the arti-  
 ficial Perspectives of long Trains of  
 intermediate Ideas.

#### S E C T. IV.

*Reason* (which we have observed to  
 be the Principle of the other Sort of  
 Comparative Sensation) is that which  
 makes

makes the chief Distinction between *ESSAY*  
Men and Brutes. *II.*

As various Ideas occur to our  Minds, it often happens that the Agreement or Disagreement of some Ideas cannot be discovered by immediately comparing them together. In this Case, as was observ'd, we make use of some intermediate or middle Idea or Ideas as a common Measure whereby to find the Agreement or Disagreement sought. Just as we measure two distant Mountains, and discover the Equality or Inequality (*i. e.* the Agreement or Disagreement) of their Proportions by means of a Quadrant. Which Operation is call'd Reasoning; and it supposes this Truth, that whatever Things agree with a Third, must likewise agree among themselves.

That Brutes have not this Degree of Perception or Sensation, may be inferr'd not only from their Inability to vary their most regular Actions (already spoken of) but likewise from their Incapacity to distinguish the Beauties of Painting and Musick; both which consist chiefly in Proportions. For from thence it appears, that tho' they may distinguish between any two particular Ideas, yet they can-


K

not

ESSAY not form general Rules with regard  
II. to the Agreement or Disagreement of  
~~~~ any Ideas; *i. e.* they cannot form  
Rules of Proportion. Consequently,
they can have no Notion of Religion
or Laws (which are no other than
general Rules of Proportion with re-
lation to Actions) any more than of
Painting or Musick.

Musick is no Musick to any but
an intelligent Ear, and Painting shews
no Beauty but that of the Colours, to
an unintelligent Eye. Some of the
brighter Colours may indeed attract
the Eye of a Brute; but the Figures
they compose, are either quite disre-
garded by him, or else mistaken for
the Things they represent. Thus like-
wise the smoother Notes may tickle
his Ear, but their Composition and
Harmony give him no Delight, but
for the most part affright him; unless
render'd familiar to him by Use, or
made agreeable by the customary Al-
lurements of Feeding or Sleeping, to
which Musick may sometimes serve as
a Call or Signal. The Reason is, he
has not the Capacity of perceiving
the regular Variety of Sounds, and
the proportionable Agreement of long
and short Notes; having no Notion
of the Time, which is their common
Measure.

Measure. The like may be said of ESSAY
Painting. II.

Dolphins, I confess, have been said  to be naturally delighted with Musick or Harmony; but this may perhaps be just as true as the Fable of *Arion*, which was built upon it. Some Birds indeed seem to imitate Musick by their Warblings: But it may be observ'd, that their wild Notes have little or nothing of what is properly call'd Musick; and besides, they are not of their own composing, but are as natural as either Crowing or Cackling. And as for artificial Tunes which they may have learn'd, it cannot be perceived that they are more delighted with them than with the Notes that are natural to them, or any other Notes or Sounds. For whatever Fondness they may seem to have of learning such Tunes, yet that is no more a Proof of any Rational Delight they take in them, than the Forwardness of a Parrot, or any other Mock-Bird, to learn and imitate the harshest Noises, proves there is any such Delight in them.

The Want of the Knowledge of Proportions in Brutes may be further exemplified in Dogs, some of the more perfect Animals. For tho' we may

ESSAY believe a Dog can very well distinguish his Master from another by his Sight, when his Master is present in Company, yet when his Master is not present, he cannot distinguish another from his Master so well by his Sight, but goes Smelling from one to another, and finds the Difference between them and his Master by his Nose: Which is a Proof that he has no fix'd Notion of the Difference of Features and bodily Proportion between his absent Master and another Man; having not the Capacity to compare them with a third Thing as a common Measure of both; to do which is the Work of Reason. 'Tis true, Things of different Bulk and Form are sufficiently distinguished by any Brute Animal, when the Difference is great; but even then, the Distinction is made either by the different Impressions that strike his external *Sensories*, or else by immediate Comparison; but not by Comparison with any third intermediate Idea, as a Measure of the Difference between them.

And as Brute Animals want the Capacity of Reasoning, so they want the Use of *Speech* (I mean discursive Speech) which is the Instrument and Interpreter of Reason. This proceeds
not

not purely from Defect in their Organs, ESSAY
but from an absolute natural Incapaci- II.
ty. For tho' several Sorts of Birds very

readily learn to speak articulately, and Beasts in general have a Sort of natural inarticulate Language, by which they express their Passions and Inclinations, yet (whatever may be reported) we have good Ground to believe they never become capable of Discourse in the natural Way; without which even articulate Speaking is no more a Proof of Reason than the Whistling of the Winds. And it was, as some think, from this Observation of the necessary Connection between the Use of discursive Speech and Reason, that the *Greeks* express'd them both by one Word, viz. λόγος.

But tho' the Use of discursive Speech is certainly a very noble Qualification, and a wonderful Advantage; yet it is not the chief or only Thing (as some would insinuate) that sets Men above the Brutes. This is clear from the Case of such Persons, who being born deaf and wanting the Benefit of Discourse by Words, become the Inventors of a great Variety of other Signs, by which they discourse: Which clearly demonstrates, that Mankind, even without the Use of Speech,
would

ESSAY would have been much more perfect,
II. sociable, and improvable than any of
the Brutes.

Besides, supposing that articulate Speech was an human Invention, it must have been contrived, and brought to some Perfection before Men could receive any considerable Improvement by it in regard to Knowledge in general, and Reasoning in particular. But the bare contriving of a Language by framing or composing Words to signify Ideas, was a clear Proof of a vastly greater Capacity than that of the most perfect Brutes, even antecedently to the mention'd Improvement by such Language or Speech.

But Speech is not the only Instrument of Reason; there are likewise *Letters* or *Characters*, by the means of which the Weakness and Imperfection of our Voice and Hearing are provided against, and our Speech, tho' consisting of fleeting Sounds, is, as it were, fix'd and render'd visible. This is still a greater Proof of the Pre-eminence of the Human Soul. For tho' all Nations have some Speech or other, yet some of them want the Benefit of the most noble Arts of Writing and Printing, which, as it were, give Visibility to Speech, where it
cannot

cannot be heard. By these Arts it is that the Soul of Man confers a Sort of Immortality on itself, even in the present State, besides the Immortality it may expect in a State that is future. By these it reasons and communicates its Discoveries to succeeding Ages, even when its Body is reduced to Dust. But Brutes act with no View to Immortality.

Some Actions of Brutes are, however, observed to bear a near Resemblance of the Effects of Reason. A Dog will privately hide a Bone in the Earth, to be reserv'd against the Time when Hunger presses him. The Ants will gnaw the Grain which they lay up for their Provision, to prevent its shooting or growing. The Bees will make their Cells in a Hexahedrical Figure with great Exactness. The Tunnies form their Shoals in the Shape of a Cube, the more easily to keep together, and the more readily to steer their Course to any Side. And (not to forget what approaches nearer to the Practice of Men) the Bevers are said to build themselves Houses with convenient Apartments, and to make Slaves of such of their own Kind as they can master. Yet all these Actions (how regular soever) are merely

ESSAY ly the Effects of Instinct, disposing
 II. them to seek the Necessaries, and, in
 ~~~~~ some Degree, Conveniences of Life;  
 for their constant Uniformity or Invari-  
 ateness sufficiently distinguishes them  
 from the Works of Reason. They  
 perform them without Teaching or  
 Contrivance, and whoever shall go a-  
 bout to instruct them how to improve  
 those natural Actions, may as well  
 pretend to teach the Thistle to bear  
 Lillies or Roses.

And as for such Actions of Brutes  
 as proceed not from any Instinct or na-  
 tural Bent of their Phantasies, but  
 are taught them by Men, we know  
 they are taught them by the means  
 either of Severities or Allurements,  
 which work upon their Imaginations,  
 but not by the Instructions of Reason.

Their other regular Actions, which  
 proceed neither from Instinct nor Dis-  
 cipline, may be compared with some  
 common Actions of our own, which  
 are often regular enough, tho' per-  
 formed, without any previous Rea-  
 soning or present Attention, merely  
 by means of the natural Connection  
 of our Ideas. Thus the Ideas of the  
 Degrees of Distance are so naturally  
 connected together, that if we have  
 Occasion to come at a Thing out of  
 our



our Reach, we need no Reasoning to convince us of the Necessity of taking the Advantage of a Stool or Ladder to bring us nearer to it. And accordingly we find that Brutes very readily make use of the same Helps, when in their Way.

ESSAY

II.

Upon the whole, there appears to be no Necessity to suppose any nobler immediate Principle of any of the Actions of Brutes than Phantasie or Imagination. And as their Actions proceed immediately from Phantasie and sensual Appetite, so they tend immediately to the Gratification of that less noble Appetite. Whereas, Men, when under the Conduct of Reason, act frequently with a higher View and from nobler Inclinations. They seek not, like the Brutes, the Food of the Body and the Gratification of their external Senses only. Their Appetite of Knowledge often excites their Industry in the Pursuit of Pleasures of which the Brutes have no Taste or Relish. In Search of these, they measure the Earth and survey the Heavens; they inquire into all Parts of the Visible, and even the Invisible World; tho' not always with Success equal to their Endeavours.

## ESSAY

## II.

## SECT. V.

Another Faculty of the Human Soul we have observ'd to be the *Volitive Power* or the Will; which when it regards deliberate Action, includes a Self-determining Power, from whence proceeds free Election or Choice. The Self-determining Power has been much magnified by some Philosophers. They call'd it the *Imperial Faculty*, and boasted that by his Liberty of Choice a Wise Man was capable of excelling even *Jupiter* himself, who, they said, was Good by pure Necessity of Nature, whereas a Wise Man was Good, or Benevolent, by Choice.

But tho' our Self-determining Power, as it imports a Freedom from Constraint, implies Perfection, yet, as it infers a Possibility of acting disagreeably to Reason (which Possibility is the only Source of evil Actions) it imports Imperfection. This may, however, be said to be such Imperfection from which no Intelligent and Free Agent, which is not perfectly Wise and Good, can be naturally exempted.

Liberty of Choice makes another very considerable Difference between the Human Soul and the Souls of Brutes.

Brutes. The Use of Speech among ESSAY  
Men is Free (for nothing is more ar- II.  
bitrary than the forming or choos-  
ing of Words) but the Language of Brutes  
is not taken up freely, but proceeds  
from a necessary Impulse of their re-  
spective Natures.

Besides this, as the Brutes have no  
Notion of Proportion, so by Conse-  
quence, they have no Notion of E-  
quality or equal Proportion. Hence  
it is, that tho' equal Objects offer  
themselves, they consider them not as  
equal, but are driven by a blind Appe-  
tite towards one or the other, with-  
out determining concerning the pro-  
portionable Goodness, Fitness or Va-  
lue. So that the Want of Reason in  
Brutes cannot consist with Liberty  
of Action; for as much as it excludes  
what is properly call'd Choice: But  
Men, can deliberately choose or re-  
fuse Things of known equal (and  
even unequal) Value. Which shews  
(as we before observ'd) that there is,  
together with Reason, a Self-deter-  
mining Principle in Man, capable of  
exerting itself by its own native Force,  
without being compelled by the  
Strength of Phantasie or sensual Ap-  
petite, or excited by the Impressions  
of external Objects.

L 2

Consequently,

ESSAY      Consequently, as Men, by means of  
 II.      their Reason, are qualified for the  
 ~~~~~ Knowledge of the Supreme Being  
 and his Laws, so by means of
 their Self-determining Power and
 Freedom of Choice they are ca-
 pable of Virtue and Vice, Re-
 wards and Punishments. And hence
 it proceeds, that Men, by the right
 or wrong Use of their Reason and Li-
 berty (or Freedom of Choice) are ca-
 pable of much greater Happiness or
 Misery than the Brutes. But of this
 we shall treat at large in the *Fourth*
Essay.

SECT. VI.

The Third and last Faculty of the Humane Soul is the *Executive Power*. But as this admits of little or no Variety, and is common both to Men and Brutes, it cannot be observ'd to make any remarkable Difference between them.

The foregoing Reflections, as they seem in some sort to exalt the Human Nature, so they tend, at the same time, to depress Human Vanity. For they teach us to think ourselves the lowest Class of Intellectual Beings, so little distinguish'd (as
 to

to Appearance) from the most perfect of Brutes, that we are forced to labour to convince some even of our own Species, (who judge by Appearances only) that the Distinction is in any respect considerable.

ESSAY
II.



The



The Third Essay.

*Of the supposed Præ-existent State
of Souls.*

SECT. I.

ESSAY
III.



THE Pythagoreans and Platonists, and, in general, all the more ancient Pagan Philosophers, who held Souls, both Sensitive and Rational, to be Substantial and Immortal, were of Opinion, that they eternally præ-existed, either singly or in their first Principle, from which they were supposed to have been taken: For *Nothing comes out of Nothing* was their constant Maxim. And even some Christian Philosophers (who hold not their Maxim) have from them derived the Opinion of a Præexistence, tho' they suppose it not to have been Eternal, but date it from the Creation.

These

These Christian Philosophers are used to argue, that it is not only unreasonable to suppose a Generation of Souls, but impious to imagine the Divine Creative Power constantly to attend on the Generation of Bodies by furnishing and infusing new created Souls, even on the Commission of Whoredom or Incest; and likewise that it is extremely absurd to think that Souls (which are such Noble Beings) are junior to every Atom of Dust. They therefore, with the *Platonists*, believe that Souls, both Rational and Sensitive, always co-existed with Matter, being cloathed with thin aerial Bodies or Vehicles, before their Descent into gross terrestrial Bodies.


Was there no other Opinion in Competition with this Doctrine of the Præexistence of Souls, but only that of their Propagation by Generation, one might easily incline to the Side of Præ-existence. But the commonly receiv'd Opinion of the new Creation of Souls seems to be more eligible than either, notwithstanding the mentioned Objections against it.

As for these Objections against the Doctrine of Souls being newly created, drawn from the Impiety of sup-

posing

ESSAY posing the Divine Power always to

III. attend on natural Generation, and
~~~~~ from the Absurdity of imagining the  
Nobler Beings to be Junior to the  
Basest; they may easily admit of An-  
swers. For we may as well say, 'tis  
a Disparagement and a Defilement to  
the Sun to shine on a Dunghill, as that  
it is unbecoming the Deity to furnish  
Souls on the mentioned Occasions. For  
as the Sun doth not sully its natural  
Brightness by following its natural  
Course and darting its Rays on so  
vile a Thing as a Dunghill, so neither  
doth the Deity debase the Purity of  
his Nature by new Creations and In-  
fusions in the Cases of Whoredom  
and Incest. For he acts only ac-  
cording to the Original established Or-  
der of Nature, tho' the Persons con-  
cern'd in those Crimes act contrary  
to their Obligations. Add to this,  
that the Opinion of the Infusion of  
Souls long since created is as liable to  
to the Charge of Impiety as this of  
the Infusion of Souls newly created.  
Yet the one or the other must be repu-  
ted the Truth, unless we imagine that  
Præ-existent Souls choose themselves  
Bodies without the least Dependence  
on the Divine Disposal.

As for Souls being Junior to Mat-<sup>EssAY</sup>ter, there is no more Absurdity in <sup>III:</sup> supposing it, than in supposing the  House to be built and furnish'd before the Introduction of the Inhabitant.

## S E C T. II:

But besides these Objections, there are several Arguments produced in favour of the Opinion of Præ-existence. For, say these *Christian Platonists*, Human Souls, after their Union with gross organical Bodies, are, as it were, confined or imprisoned, and condemn'd to receive their Ideas of external Objects through the narrow Windows of the *Sensories*; and sometimes even to live, as it were, in Darkness by the stopping up of those *Sensories*. And as a Malefactor in a Jail not only has a very limited Prospect, but is often offended by the Noisomeness of the Place, so are Souls, say they, while thus embodied, not only confin'd but subject to be wrought upon by the disorderly Motions of the Animal Spirits, and to be render'd incapable of exerting some of their noblest Acts, by reason of internal Defects. The Seeds of Diseases, which they often bring into the World together with their Bodies, expose them to the acutest Pains, and

M

to




ESSAY to the growing Anguish of many lingering Distempers; in which a great  
 III. Part of the Unhappiness of Life consists. But, say they, how are the Imprisonment and Torture of an Innocent even without his Consent, reconcileable to the Notion of a most Just and Good Being, who governs the World? Were it not therefore better, continue they, to suppose that Souls are thus punish'd not for the Faults of others, but for Crimes of their own, committed in a Præ-existent State?

But to this may be answer'd, that our Bodies, tho' they are in some respects Impediments, yet, when rightly disposed, they are sufficiently convenient Habitations for our Souls. And as for the Disorders and Pains, to which Human Souls, while embodied, are subject; Are not the Souls even of Brutes, which are supposed by these Philosophers to have likewise præ-existed, liable to much the same Inconveniencies? Are not the Souls of Brutes, tho' incapable of Crimes or immoral Actions, shut up likewise in gross organical Bodies?

Were it not therefore better to conclude that the present embodied State, is a State for which the Souls both of  
 Men





Men and Brutes were originally de- ESSAY  
 sign'd by the Great Author of Nature, III.  
 and that the Inconveniencies they are   
 subject to, are, at least, equall'd by  
 the Pleasure they at present enjoy, or  
 else that they may be more than com-  
 pensated by other Pleasures in a fu-  
 ture State?

### S E C T. III.

But the Fondness of some People for this Opinion of Præ-existence, has put them upon attempting a more direct Proof. Whether the World was from Eternity, or whether it was created by an All-wise, Almighty and most Beneficent Being, 'tis plain, say they, that in either Case, Souls must be supposed to have existed before they entered into organical Bodies. For if the World was from Eternity, they could not but be from Eternity likewise; as being no Effects of any Concretions, Combinations or Modifications of Matter, but, at least, as substantial Parts of the World as Matter itself. If on the contrary, the World was not eternal, but created by such a Being as beforemention'd, 'tis most reasonable to suppose him to have created Souls as early, at least, as Matter; since to suppose so, is most

ESSAY suitable to his Goodness. For, continue they, if it was good for Souls to be at all, then the sooner they were the better; but the Goodness of God could not but incline him to the better Side.

III.  With the Eternity of the World we have nothing here to do: For these are supposed to be *Christian Platonists*, and to believe a Creation. 'Tis therefore the latter part of the Argument, relating to the earlier or later Creation of Souls, which concerns us at present. The Perfect Goodness of the Divine Nature, say they, could not but determine the Great Creator to produce Souls, at least, as early as Matter: But how doth this appear? Was he not All-sufficient and perfectly Free as well as Good? Did his Goodness exclude Indetermination in every Case? To have created nothing but inanimate Matter would indeed have been unworthy his Perfect Wisdom as well as his Goodness. But since Matter was designed to furnish Habitations for Souls, was it not more suitable to his Wisdom (as we hinted elsewhere) first to prepare the Habitations, and then to introduce the Inhabitants? or could the Production of  
Souls

Souls a few Years (or even some thou- ESSAY  
 sands of Years) sooner or later make III.  
 any considerable Difference with re-   
 gard to the Existence of Immortal  
 Unperishable Beings?

To conclude : As the Proofs of the supposed Præ-existent State of Souls are very defective, so there lies a very great Objection against it. For, it may be said, if Human Souls existed in another embodied State before they enter'd the grosser Bodies they now inhabit, how comes it that they have not so much as a general Remembrance of their Præ-existence in that State ; especially since the Idea of Existence, attended with the general Ideas of Happiness or Unhappiness, depends not on the Body, but is fix'd and, as it were, riveted in the Soul ; being preserv'd in our Sleep, and even in Apoplexies, Catalepsies, and other Diseases of the Brain, in which if we at any time imagine we had forgot ourselves, as we express it, yet some time or other it is found that the Soul was still awake and conscious not only of its Existence, but of its State and Circumstances ?

The



## The Fourth Essay.

*Of the future States of Souls.*

### SECT. I.

ESSAY  
IV.



**T**HAT the Human Soul will be capable of Sensation both Internal and External, and likewise of its other Affections and of Local Motion, after the Death of its Body, hath been shewn in the *First Essay*. The manner of its *External* Sensation after Death in a separate State, may appear from the following Reflections.

That it is not properly the Eye that sees, or the Ear that hears, or the Hand or any other Part of the Body that feels (as *Epicurus* held) but that the Soul, which is seated in the Brain, sees, hears and feels by the means of those Members, is plain from what has already



already been observ'd. 'Tis therefore no less plain, that if any of those Members by means of which Seeing, Hearing or any other Sensation is perform'd, were separated or cut off from the Body, yet if the usual Impressions from Objects were continued so as to affect, as formerly, the Extremities of the Nerves which once join'd to those Members, the Soul would, even without the help of those Members, have the same Sensations as usual. Accordingly we find, that after cutting off an Arm or Leg, the Patient sometimes feels the Cold as if it were in his Fingers or Toes. From hence we may infer, that tho' all the Members, Nerves, and even all other Parts of the Body were cut off from the Brain, yet if the Spirits in the Brain were still affected, or wrought upon in the usual manner, the Soul, whose Seat is among those Spirits, might still have the same Sensations. And finally, by the same method of arguing, if the grosser Substance even of the Brain itself were dissolv'd, yet if the Spirits, or any other subtile Particles, were still capable of being wrought upon by Objects and of affecting the Soul as usual, the Soul tho' separate from the Body, might, by their means, be capable of its usual Sen-



ESSAY Sensations. And this is true not only  
IV. of Rational, but of Sensitive Souls.

~~~~~ But some; perhaps, will say, If the Soul in a separate State can have Sensations of surrounding Objects without the Help of the external Organs of Sensation, how comes it that it is not at present sensible of the Structure and Situation of that part of the Brain wherein it resides?

To this I answer: As the Eye is the noblest of the external Organs or Sensories, so from the Structure of it, we may form some Idea of the Design and Contrivance of Nature in framing the common Sensorie in the Brain, which is the Seat of the Soul.

In the Structure of the Eye, Nature had plainly two several Ends or Designs in View. One was the preventing any wrong Tincture of the Images form'd in the Bottom of it by the Rays of Light. The other was the preventing of any thing that might draw off our Attention from those Images. The first of these Ends is gain'd by means of the whitish Colour of the Tunicle on which the mentioned Images are delineated; which preserves the Purity and Distinction of Colours in the Images.

In like manner, to prevent (as it seems) any such wrong Tincture of the Images or Signatures in the Brain, its inward Surface bordering on the Cavities, where is the Place of the common Sensorie is white, and of a Texture most capable of all Impressions. ESSAY
IV.

As for the other End or Design of Nature in the Structure of the Eye, *viz.* the preventing any thing that might divert or draw off our Attention from the Images form'd in it, 'tis sufficiently obtain'd, chiefly by means of the Blackness of the Uveous Tunicle, which, as it reflects not any of the Rays which pass into it, is not at all perceiv'd by us while it transmits the pure Images of Objects to the Bottom of the Eye.

In like manner, to prevent any thing that might turn off our Attention from the supposed Images in the Brain, 'twas necessary that its inward Surface should be unperceiv'd by the Soul. To render it thus unperceiv'd, Nature (as it seems) contriv'd the Cavities or hollow Spaces of the Brain so anfractuious or intricate, that the Rays or Lines of the Animal Spirits, which, by reason of their perpetual intestine Motion, naturally reflect from the in-

N ward

ESSAY ward Surface of those Cavities, are
 IV. either broken or else so weak or con-
 fused that they cannot reduce them-
 selves to a Point in such Numbers as
 are sufficient to cause any considerable
 Perception of that Surface in the
 Soul: Whereas, on the contrary, the
 Images of Objects are supposed to be
 so minute that comparatively few
 Rays of those Spirits may produce a
 Sensation of them. And tho' the Soul
 has Power over the Spirits, to move
 them more strongly in streight Lines
 against the Surface of the Cavities,
 yet this Power appears to extend but
 to few of those Spirits at once. For
 if it extended to all or any considera-
 ble part of the Spirits, the Soul would
 have it more in its Power to still or
 compose their Fluctuations, caused by
 violent Passions, and not be, as it were,
 overborn by them, as of ten happens.

But however this may be, 'tis most
 clear from what has been observ'd both
 in this and the former *Essays*, that un-
 bodied Souls are still capable not only
 of Local Motion, but of Sensations
 both internal and external, and likewise
 of other Affections; tho' it seems, they
 cannot either retain or revive the par-
 ticular Sensations of external Objects,
 and therefore cannot have any parti-
 cular

cular Remembrance of those Objects; as was likewise observ'd.

ESSAY
IV.

SECT. II.

But to render the Dependence of the particular Remembrance of external Objects on a fitly disposed Body still more evident, I shall proceed to answer an Objection or two.

It may be said, Cannot a Soul, when strip'd of its Body, see without an Eye and hear without an Ear? Why then may it not remember without the Brain or any bodily Substance equivalent to the Brain?

I answer, In Seeing and Hearing the Soul is only attentive to the Impressions which the Eye and Ear receive from the Objects of those Sensations, which differs little from its being purely Passive. But in the reviving Sensations caused by those Objects (which produces what we call Remembering) we are conscious that it acts vigorously on its Instruments the Spirits, and by them on the Brain. Therefore tho' the Soul, when strip'd of its Body, may very well be conceiv'd, by bare Attention, to acquire Sensations of external Objects without the Help of its Eye or Ear, yet it cannot be supposed capable of reviving the par-

ESSAY particular Sensations of those Objects
 IV. or of remembering them) without
 ~~~~~ the Instrumentality of the Brain or  
 something equivalent.

Besides, As the first Sensations of Objects depend on the Presence of the Objects, and therefore cease as soon as they are removed; so the particular Remembrance of Objects, which depends on their Ideas revived by the means of the Brain, must likewise cease when the Brain is remov'd, and nothing else is capable of supplying the Want of it. For we have proved that those Ideas are not inherent in the Soul.

But if this be so, may it be said, what Notion can we have of the Memory of Intelligent Beings of a superior Rank?

I answer: 'Tis not unreasonable to think that all Intelligent Beings (the Uncreated Being only excepted) are naturally Souls, and that they were created to inhabit and actuate Bodies (as was the Opinion of many of the Fathers, and even of the Second *Nicene* Council) which Bodies, tho' more refined than the human Body, we may reasonably believe are so disposed as to serve as Instruments not only of external Sensation but of Memory; as  
 well



well at least or much better than our ESSAY  
groffer Bodies. IV.

To suppose there are many Species of Intelligent Beings gradually surmounting each other between the Human Soul and the Great Uncreated Being, is very suitable to the Analogy of Nature, and that Regularity which is to be observed in all its Works. We find a vast Variety of Species gradually descending between the Soul of Man and the Soul of the least perfect Brute; and why should we think it unreasonable to suppose a great Variety of others gradually ascending between the Human Soul and the Supreme Being?

### S E C T. III.

Having thus cleared our Way, we may now proceed to consider what becomes of the Souls of both Men and Brutes after the Death of their Bodies.

Some People who were very well inclined to admit of the Immortality and Perpetuity of the Souls of Brutes, have found themselves so perplex'd how to dispose of them in the future State, that they have been at last tempted to assert either that they were dissolved

ESSAY solved or dissipated, or else annihilated or reduced to Nothing.

~~~~~ But as for their *Dissolution* or *Dissipation*, it cannot be supposed, if they are Sensitive or Thinking Beings. For we have proved, that such Beings are not a Composition or any thing resulting from a Composition or Temperament of their Bodies.

Those who allow Sensation to the Souls of Brutes, and yet contend they are either a Composition, or else the Result of the Composition and Temperament of the Parts of their Bodies, do in effect deprive themselves of the main Argument (derived from the Nature of Sensation) which proves that the Humane Soul is a distinct Substance from the Body. For if Sensation be the Result of a Composition and Temperament of Parts in Brutes, why not in Men? This the famous *Des Cartes* was so well aware of (as was likewise *Pereira* before him) that rather than allow any Sensation to Brutes (to which he was not disposed to grant Immortality) he chose to reduce them to the State of mere Machines, or insensible Pieces of Clockwork. It likewise deserves to be considered, that the Writers who have most confidently pretended to prove the

the Soul of Man to be nothing distinct from his Body, and therefore Mortal, have chiefly grounded their Confidence on the Analogy, or Resemblance that there is between the Sensations and Actions of Brutes and those of Men, together with the common Opinion that the Souls of Brutes are not essentially distinct from their Bodies, but are dissolv'd or dissipated at Death. ESSAY IV.

As for the *Annihilation* of the Souls of Brutes, it cannot, perhaps, be proved to be absolutely inconsistent with Reason. For what Absurdity can there be in supposing a Thing to be Annihilated when it has fully serv'd the End of its Creation? But for ought with any Certainty appears, the End or Design of their Creation might not extend beyond the present Scene of Things. Yet since they are Substances, or as real Parts of the Creation as any others, 'tis more probable they will be continued in Being, for Reasons given elsewhere. *

* P. 55, 56.

S E C T. IV.

In answer to the Query, How will the Souls of Brutes be disposed of, in case they are continued in Being? It might perhaps be sufficient to say,
That

ESSAY That the great Author of Nature who
 IV. gave them Being; will, if he incline
 ~~~~~ to continue it, dispose of them in such  
 Manner as is perfectly agreeable with  
 his Wisdom and Goodness : But to  
 gratify an innocent Curiosity, it may  
 not be amiss to attempt a more par-  
 ticular Answer.

We have observ'd that it is by means of that Part of the Body call'd the Brain that Souls, in the Present or Natural State, Remember, by retaining and reviving the Ideas and Sensations of Things. Consequently, when separate from their Bodies, they may be supposed to be not only in a Preternatural but, in some Respects, an Imperfect State. It has likewise been observ'd, that merely Sensitive Souls, being Irrational and Necessary Agents, cannot be accountable for their Actions; and therefore cannot reasonably be supposed to be reserved for Rewards or Punishments on account of any Actions done in the present State.

From these Premises it may not be unreasonable to conclude, that since to be embodied is their natural State, or their State of Perfection, and since no Reason can be assign'd for their remaining unembodied, they will there-  
 fore

fore pass from one Mortal Corruptible Body to another, till it shall please the Great Creator to unite them to Incorruptible Bodies (tho' not by way of a Resurrection) and to place them in some Final State suited to their respective Natures; agreeably to the seeming Import of that most remarkable Text, *Rom. viii. 21. Because the Creature itself also shall be delivered from the Bondage of Corruption, &c.*

ESSAY  
IV.

Whatever may be thought of this Text, it must be allowed, that the Considerations above, render such a Supposition highly probable. But as for the Case of Human Souls, 'tis not only probable, but certain, that being Reasonable, and therefore Accountable Beings, they will be adjudged by the most Just Governor of the World either to Rewards or Punishments, according to the Nature of their respective Actions.

The *Pythagorean* Transmigration of Human Souls from one Animal Body to another, was, I confess, design'd as an Expedient to salve the Honour of the Divine Justice by Rewards and Punishments even in the present State of Things. But the Expedient falls vastly short of the De-

O


sign:



ESSAY sign. For, besides that the most despicable and hateful Animals are capable of enjoying more sensual Pleasure than can well be supposed consistent with a State of Punishment, it may very reasonably be queried, What Punishment can it be to the Souls of bad Men, who delight to act the Parts of Wolves, Foxes, Swine and Serpents in Human Shape, to pass into the real Bodies of those Animals, and to act over the same Parts in the proper Shapes? And what Happiness can it be to the Good and Virtuous, who suffer at present by the Cruelty, Rapacity and Subtilty of wicked Men, to pass into the Bodies of Sheep, Doves and such-like innocent and defenceless Creatures, and become again liable to the same Calamities?

## S E C T. V.

As for the State of final Rewards and Punishments, which we oppose to the imaginary State of Transmigration; it seems not to be necessary either in point of Reason or Scripture, to suppose that it commences immediately after the Separation of Soul and Body: But it seems very agreeable to Both, to think that Human Souls,

Souls, when the Scene shall change ESSAY  
 to their Final State, will be fix'd at IV.  
 once in that State, according to the   
 different Natures of their respective  
 Actions. Consequently, the Opinion  
 of an Intermediate or Middle State of  
 Humane Souls between their Separation  
 from their Bodies and their Final  
 State, of Rewards or Punishments,  
 neither seems to be unreasonable  
 nor unscriptural.

Some Peculiar Favourites of Heaven  
 have indeed (according to the  
 Scripture Account) been put into  
 immediate Possession of their Final  
 Happiness: But the Scriptures give  
 us no sufficient Ground to think so of  
 the Souls of all other Virtuous Men.  
 On the contrary, the Final State of  
 Humane Souls is every where declared  
 to be consequent on the General  
 Judgment.

The Apostate Angels are likewise  
 said to be *reserv'd in Chains of Dark-  
 ness to the Judgment of the Great Day*:  
 Which is certainly a Figurative Ex-  
 pression; being an Allusion to a State  
 of Imprisonment in dark Dungeons,  
 where Prisoners are kept in Chains  
 till Judgment is past. And the Im-  
 prisonment or Confinement even of  
 those Evil Spirits, is represented to

ESSAY be neither so close nor so strict as to  
 IV. deprive them of all Liberty: So that  
 even the Devils appear to be in a  
 Middle State, notwithstanding that  
 Hell is said to have been prepared  
 for them in particular. After the  
 same Manner may the Souls of wick-  
 ed Men be likewise supposed to be  
 confined till the General Judgment:  
 For 'tis said, that *Judas went to his  
 Place*, viz. of *Confinement*, and we  
 read of the *Spirits in Prison*.

'Tis likewise not unworthy our  
 Notice, that whereas 'tis said, *there is  
 more Joy among the Angels in Heaven  
 over one Sinner that repenteth, than  
 over Ninety and nine Just Persons that  
 need no Repentance*, there is no Men-  
 tion made of the Saints rejoicing on  
 such an Occasion; which 'tis reason-  
 able to think would not have been  
 omitted, if all the Saints (or Virtu-  
 ous Humane Souls) since the Creation  
 had been, immediately on the Death  
 of their Bodies, translated into the  
 Heavenly Mansions. 'Tis further re-  
 markable, that, on the contrary, *A-  
 braham*, by whose *Bosom* St. *Austin*  
 supposes the Intermediate or Middle  
 State of Happiness to be meant, is  
 said to be *ignorant of us*.

Besides

Besides the Testimony of St. *Au-* Essay  
*stin*, we have the almost universal IV.  
 Consent of the other Fathers (which  
 may be look'd upon as the General  
 Tradition of the Christian Church  
 from the earliest Ages) on the Side of  
 an *Intermediate* State. For as the  
 Learned Monsieur *Daillé* in his Trea-  
 tise *De usu Patrum* observes, the ma-  
 jor Part of the ancient Fathers were  
 of Opinion that Heaven was not to  
 be opened till the Day of Judgment.  
 Nor was this so general Consent of  
 theirs (as he further observes) contra-  
 dicted by any Declaration of the  
 Church for the Space of Fourteen  
 hundred Years; nor did any of the  
 later Fathers pretend to refute this  
 Opinion \*. We may add, that the  
 ancient *Jews* (according to Dr. *Po-*  
*cock*) supposed the Happiness of de-  
 parted Souls to be imperfect till the  
 General Judgment, and their Resi-  
 dence to be, not in Heaven, but in  
 a Place which they called *Para-*  
*dise*.

## S E C T. VI.

As to the Nature and Circumstances  
 of the *Intermediate* State of Humane  
 Souls

\* *Dallæus de Usu Patrum*, p. 107. Par. II.

ESSAY Souls there have been very different  
IV. Conjectures.

Some have imagin'd, with the *Platonists*, that the Soul, when separated from it's Gross Body, would be cloath'd with a thin Aerial Body, which they thought was necessary to qualify it for External Sensation and Motion, neither of which could, as they thought, agree to a purely Immaterial Being, when strip'd of a Body. But this is a pure Notion of Paganism, and is far from being countenanc'd by the Christian Revelation. For that Divine Revelation says, not that we shall be cloath'd with refined and immortal Bodies before the Resurrection; but that then we shall be made like the Angels, or adorn'd with Spiritual or Angelical Bodies.

Others, who were likewise of Opinion, that Souls were perfectly Immaterial (or had nothing in common with Bodies) finding that the Scripture represents the Space between Death and the Resurrection as a Naked or Unbodied State, and at the same time concluding that Immaterial Souls could neither receive Sensations from nor act upon Matter or Bodies without the Help of Bodies, have thought that the Intermediate State  
of




of Souls was a State of pure Insensibility and Inactivity, and have compared it to a *Sleep*. But this seems, however to be no necessary Consequence of their Opinion of the Soul's Immateriality. For whenever our Souls have Sensations of External Things even in the Present State, they have them not (according to these Gentlemen) through the Instrumentality of their Bodies, (which cannot act on what is purely Immaterial) but derive them from the immediate Operation of the Divine Power, which causes them to be so or so affected according as their Bodies receive such or such Impressions from other Bodies. But why might not Sensations have been supposed to be immediately excited in Souls by the Divine Power as well when without Bodies as when cloathed with Bodies, which (according to these Philosophers) contribute nothing to Sensation?

But that Souls when strip'd of Bodies, are still (without any such Operation of the Divine Power) as capable, or rather more capable, of External Sensations and other Actions and Passions than before, was shewn in the First Essay. The only Imperfection of Souls in the Unbodied State seems

ESSAY seems to be the Want of a particular  
 IV. Remembrance of external Objects,  
 ~~~~~ proceeding from an Inability to revive  
 Past Sensations: On which Account
 they are said in Scripture to be *ignorant of us*. Their Ideas or *Thoughts*
 of External Objects, and all their
 Schemes and Imaginations form'd
 on those Ideas, and the Particular
Knowledge resulting from thence,
perish and cease (as the Scripture says,
Eccles. ix. 5. and 1 Cor. xiii. 9, 10.)
 together with the Manner of their
 Sensation of such Objects; so that
 what Remembrance they have with
 Relation to those Objects of Sense, must
 be supposed to consist purely in General
 Notions of Things and Actions.
 Thus, they may still, in a greater or
 lesser Degree, preserve a General Notion
 of their past Conduct while embodied,
 of the good Use or Abuse of their Liberty,
 or of their Obedience or Disobedience to the
 Divine Laws. And 'tis Reflection on these that
 we may conceive most frequently to employ
 their Thoughts. So that the chief Happiness
 or Unhappiness of Souls in the Intermediate
 State must (as well as in the Final State)
 result from the Consciousness of their Good
 or Bad Conduct in the Present State.

Next

Next to this, we may conceive ESSAY
 their Employment to consist in Spe- IV.
 culation, For being deprived of the 
 Memory of Corporeal Things, their
 Thoughts, we may believe, are turn-
 ed, of course, towards Intellectual
 Objects. They contemplate the Nature
 of the Deity, of themselves, and pro-
 bably of innumerable Species of Be-
 ings invisible to us. And this may be
 another Source either of Happiness
 or Unhappiness, according as they are
 differently qualified.

Such an Intermediate State is suffi-
 ciently distinguish'd from the imagi-
 nary *Purgatory* of the *Pagans* and *Ro-*
manists, and it would be a Disparage-
 ment to any Man's Understanding to
 suspect it favour'd that groundless O-
 pinion. Besides, who doth not see
 that the immediate Admission of the
 Souls of Saints or Holy Men into
 Heaven and the Detention of so ma-
 ny others in Purgatory, are Doctrines
 receiv'd and entertain'd by a certain
 Church with a View to secular Inte-
 rest?

What has been observed concern-
 ing an intermediate State, seems in-
 deed to destroy the Credibility of
 the usual Stories of the *Apparitions*
 of departed Souls, which Apparitions
 are commonly said to proceed from a

P

Desire

ESSAY Desire in those Souls to settle some or
 IV. other secular Affair; of which Affairs we have seen Reason to think departed Souls have no particular Knowledge or Remembrance. If therefore Apparitions at any time happen, they must, it seems, be supposed (in ordinary Cases at least) to be caused by some other Intelligent Beings; perhaps by condensing their subtile Bodies, and so rendring them visible. And this is the more probable, if it be Fact, that the Forms or Shapes of some Persons have been seen before their Death.

S E C T. VII.

I am not unsensible that though an Intermediate State of Souls is favoured both by Scripture and Reason, and likewise by the Voice of Antiquity, yet there are some Texts or Passages in Scripture which are commonly thought to oppose it.

'Tis objected, That in the *Revelations* we read of *the Souls under the Altar in Heaven*, who continually cry for Vengeance on their cruel Persecutors.

But this is plainly a figurative Expression, and can signify no more than that the Sufferings of Good Men in the Cause of Truth, are had in continual Remembrance by God. It

It may likewise be urged, That we ESSAY
 read in the same mystical Book of *an* IV.
innumerable Multitude of all Nations
and Tongues in the heavenly Man-
 sions.

But as this is only a Prophetical
 Vision, there can nothing be inferred
 from the particular Representations
 which it contains. Otherwise, we
 might infer there ate Armies in Hea-
 ven riding on *white Horses*, as is said,
Chap. x. ver. 14.

But, may it be said, The noted Pa-
 rable of the rich Man and the Beggar,
 speaks of an immediate Translation
 of Souls either to Heaven or Hell af-
 ter Death.

To this I answer, 'Twas the Opi-
 nion of St. *Austin*, as was before ob-
 served, that by *Abraham's Bosom*,
 which is mention'd in this Parable and
 supposed by many to signify Heaven,
 nothing else is meant but the Inter-
 mediate State of Happiness. So that
 by *Asis* or *Hades*, which is here op-
 posed to *Abraham's Bosom*, and which
 our Translators have taken the Liberty
 to render *Hell*, he must have under-
 stood no more than an Intermediate
 State of Misery; and, consequently,
 'tis most probable, that by *Flames* and

ESSAY *Torment* he understood Self-torment-
IV. ing or Remorse of Conscience.

~~~~~ But supposing Heaven and Hell to be here meant; yet as this is but a Parable, the Design of it was not to teach any Point of Speculation, but only to inculcate what we call the *Moral*, or Lesson which relates to Practice. The Opinion which some, without Ground, imagine to have prevail'd at that Time among the *Jews*, concerning the Immediate Passage of Souls either to Heaven or Hell, is indeed contrary to the clearest Hints that are given in the *Old Testament* with reference to the Future State; particularly to the two Noted Texts, *Job* ix. 25. and *Dan.* xii. 2, 3. Yet since that Opinion may be said to have yielded as good a Foundation for the Moral, which our Saviour had in View, as the Truth could have done, he might here, as on other Occasions, accommodate his Discourse to the Capacities of the People, and direct their Practice without contradicting their Opinion. The rather, because their supposed Opinion, tho' Erroneous, differed from the Truth but in the Circumstance of Time, by only antedating

ting the Happiness and Misery of the Final State; which was a Matter of little or no Importance. Accordingly, the Learned have long since agreed, that not the Circumstances and Incidents, but the main Scope or Design of Parables is to be attended to.

The Words of our Saviour to the penitent Thief on the Cross, are likewise quoted on this Occasion, *viz. To Day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.*

But there is no Difficulty in this. For it must be supposed that our Saviour spoke to the Thief in a manner suitable to his Apprehension. He must therefore be allow'd to have made use of the Word *Paradise* in the Sense wherein it was then used among the *Jews*. But *Paradise*, according to the Use of the Word even at that Time, signified not Heaven, but an Intermediate State of Happiness \*. 'Tis likewise certain, that the Soul of our Saviour himself is not said to have ascended into Heaven till some considerable Time after his Crucifixion. The Soul of the Thief was therefore with the Soul of our Saviour in the Intermediate State of Virtuous and Penitent Souls; which State

was

\* Pocock. Not. misc. cap. 6. p. 176.

ESSAY was very fitly term'd *Paradise* and *Abraham's Bosom* (by way of Allusion to a Pleasant Garden and a Delicious Feast) as being a State of Happiness, though not the Final State of Rewards.

'Tis further objected, that the Apostle *Paul*, Phil. i. 23, and in another Place, declares his Desire *to depart, or to be absent from the Body, and to be present with Christ*.

In answer to this it might be sufficient to say, that the Expression *to be present with Christ* may signify no more than to be in the Custody and under the more Immediate Protection of Christ. For in such a Sense the Words of Christ himself, when expiring on the Cross, have been generally and with Reason understood, *viz. Father, into thy Hands I commend my Spirit*; forasmuch as it doth not appear that his Soul was receiv'd into the Glorious Presence of God till after his visible Ascension into Heaven.

But not to seem to have Recourse to a Figure without sufficient Reason, I shall humbly offer the following Reflections.

The Planet *Mercury*, as being the nearest of all the Planetary Chorus to the Sun, may be said to be most immediately

mediately present with that glorious Body. Yet this doth not hinder but that *Venus*, the *Earth* and the other Planets may likewise, in a proper Sense, be said to be present with it, as partaking of its Light and Influence, tho' in a less Degree, and at a greater Distance. Let us now suppose the upper World to be divided into two Regions or Orbs, one of which may be termed the Final or Heavenly, the other the Intermediate or Paradisiacal State of Souls. Let us further suppose the Glorified Body of Christ (agreeably to *Rev.* xxi. 23.) to be as a Sun diffusing Light and Influence on both these Orbs or Regions, tho' in unequal Degrees and at unequal Distances. On this Supposition, 'tis clear, that the Inhabitants of both these Regions may very properly be said to be present with him, because they all partake of his Light and Influence.

ESSAY  
IV.

This Hypothesis is very agreeable to the Opinion of Divines of most Denominations; who allow that the Glorified Body of Christ, as at his Transfiguration, so now in his State of Exaltation especially, is very luminous.

But

ESSAY

IV.


But some will further say, Did not the Protomartyr *Stephen* see the *Heavens opened*, &c. *Acts* vii. 56. and did he not, when expiring, cry, *Lord Jesus receive my Spirit*?

I answer, What *Stephen* saw, was indeed a Representation of the Heavenly Glory, for the strengthening of his Faith against his approaching Martyrdom: But no Man needs suppose it was an Opening of Heaven in order to his immediate Reception there. And as for his dying Words (which are like those of our Saviour on the Cross) they only express the actual Strength of his Faith and Confidence in Christ, for whose Cause he suffered; and they need not be supposed to signify any more than this, *viz.* “ I commit  
“ my departing Soul to thy Care, to  
“ be reserv’d to the Enjoyment of  
“ that Heavenly Glory, for which  
“ thou hast encouraged me to hope.”

’Tis likewise objected, That *Solomon* says, *Eccles.* xii. 7. *Then shall the Dust return to the Earth as it was, and the Spirit to God that gave it.*

But as this Text speaks of the Souls of All Men, both Good and Bad, without Exception; and as *returning to God*, in a proper Sense (*i. e.* entering into Heaven) can import no less than



than their entering into a fixed State, ESSAY  
therefore if it prove any thing to the IV.  
present Purpose, it must be this, *viz.*   
that the Souls of the Wicked, as well  
as of the Good, are received into Heaven immediately after Death, to be eternally happy in the Beatifical Presence of God. But this is too absurd and impious to be imagined. The Text then can import no more than this, that, after Death, the Souls of all Men, both Good and Bad, remain in the Custody and at the Disposal of their Great Creator.

'Tis therefore a figurative Expression: And it may not be impertinent, on occasion of what has been here and elsewhere said, to observe, that the explaining in a proper Sense the figurative Expressions of the Scriptures (which, according to the Genius of the *Hebrew* Language, abound with them) has been, in my humble Opinion, the Original of most Errors in Divinity.

It must indeed be confess'd, that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the figurative from the proper Sense; especially if we are led by Interest or Prejudice, and reject the Assistance that Reason offers. But in the present Case, Interest alone seems to

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
have

ESSAY have got the Ascendant of Reason. For  
 IV. whereas the Doctrine of an Intermediate State had prevailed above Fourteen hundred Years without any considerable Opposition, it was at last condemn'd, in the Fifteenth Age, by the Popish Council of *Florence*, which decreed, " That the Souls of Saints " were immediately received into " Heaven, and admitted to the Vision of God." And it is by this Decree that the whole Fabrick of the most profitable *Romish* Superstitions, with regard to the Saints, is supported; such as Canonizations, Invocation, Image-worship, Reliques, Pilgrimages, meritorious Vows, &c.

#### S E C T. VIII.

When the whole Human Race shall have fully acted their several Parts on the Stage of this inferiour World, 'tis perfectly agreeable not only to Christianity but to Reason, to think, that a general Day or Time of Account will come, when every Man, in the most solemn and awful manner, will be judg'd according to his Works.

As for the Opinion of a particular Judgment to be pass'd on every Man immediately after Death, 'tis humbly conceiv'd to have no manner of Foundation

dation either in Scripture or Reason, ESSAY  
 and to be no other than a Shift which IV.  
 some People have been reduced to in   
 Defence of what appears to be an er-  
 roneous Opinion; I mean, the im-  
 mediate Translation of Humane Souls  
 either to Heaven, Hell or Purgatory.

### S E C T. IX.


But if separate Souls are, as we late-  
 ly observ'd, in a preternatural and im-  
 perfect State, as having no particular  
 Remembrance of many of their Acti-  
 ons in the present State, for want of  
 a Power to revive the Sensations of  
 corporeal or bodily Objects; which  
 Power depends on their Union with  
 Bodies; 'tis farther reasonable to con-  
 clude, that before the General Judg-  
 ment, they will (agreeably to the  
 Christian Revelation) be again cloath-  
 ed with Bodies, and furnish'd with  
 the Means of reviving the necessary  
 Sensations. These Bodies the Chri-  
 stian Revelation says will consist of  
 the same individual Substance with  
 their former Bodies, rais'd by the Di-  
 vine Power, but refined, and in all  
 respects so disposed as to be more ca-  
 pable of assisting the Soul's Opera-  
 tions. By the Help of these refined  
 or spiritual Bodies (as it is not unrea-

ESSAY sonable to think) the Remembrance  
 IV. of the minutest Actions and Circumstances of Actions will be revived, and all Men will be readily brought to confess the Equity of the Sentence of the Great Judge: For his Sentence will need no other Evidence to justify it but the Testimony of every Man's own Conscience.

One natural Reason for uniting Humane Souls to their former Bodies, rather than to others, may (as we elsewhere observed \*) be drawn from the strong Inclination they may still be conceived to have to those Bodies, which Inclination, being Natural, will not be frustrated. But the chief Reason for such Reunion is furnished by the Christian Revelation itself, and is to this Effect. Bodily Death being one of the evil Consequences of the First Sin, and a Saviour being sent to make not only sufficient but abundant Reparation for all the Evils occasioned by that Sin, it was very fit and necessary that he should bring about the Reunion and Resurrection of Humane Bodies.

But what Bounds can be set to humane Curiosity? Some will here enquire, What will be the Structure of

\* *Christian Religion founded on Reason* p. 137

of those refined Bodies at the Resur- ESSAY  
rection, and by what Ligaments will IV.  
their Parts be held together? 

To this I answer by another Question: Who perfectly knows the Structure of our present grosser Bodies, or can tell us how the Substance of their very Ligaments is so closely and strongly connected or held together?

Besides, tho' we should suppose the Humane Body at the Resurrection, with regard to the Subtility and Looseness of its Particles, to resemble Air or Flame, yet it may not, like them, be capable of Diffipation. A faint Image of such a subtile Body we have in the invisible Particles of the Loadstone; which, notwithstanding the Opposition they meet with from other Bodies in passing continually through the Poles of the Stone, are not easily either obstructed or dissipated, tho' we have no Idea either of the Cause of their Motion, or of the Bands that hold them together.

But since the Scriptures determine nothing concerning this, we are at Liberty to imagine some Connection between certain Parts, at least, of those refined or spiritual Bodies: The rather, because on this Hypothesis, it may more easily be conceived how  
the



ESSAY the supposed Images of pass'd Objects  
 IV. may be both impress'd and preserv'd,  
 ~~~~~ and consequently, how Sensations  
 may be revived and retained.

S E C T. X.

The Final and most Important State of Humane Souls, which follows the General Judgment, cannot but deserve our greatest Attention. The Thoughts of this, tend not only to gratify our Curiosity, but to render us Wiser and Better. In the present State we are like Travellers: The greatest Happiness and Unhappiness lie before us; and it behoves us to be very solicitous about the Ways. For not the Pleasantness of a Way, but the End of the Journey is chiefly to be regarded. The Way to Happiness, as we all ought to know, is Obedience to the Laws of the Supreme Governor; the Way to Unhappiness is the Reverse. The right Choice will, at once, be our highest Wisdom, and truest Interest.

What Reason teaches with regard to the Unhappiness of the Final or Last State, is no more than this, *viz.* that it will be most justly proportion'd to the Demerits of the Disobedient. But as for the Happiness of that State,
 Reason

Reason doth not proportion it to any Merits of the Virtuous or Obedient, but to the Beneficence of the Great Author of Nature, who is an overflowing Fountain of Goodness. ESSAY
IV.

S E C T. XI.

This Account that Reason gives, is indeed a very general one; and therefore as People are not wont to rest satisfied with Generals, Imagination has been set at work (I mean among the *Pagans*) to invent particular Descriptions.

The most noted Descriptions of the Happiness and Unhappiness of a future State of Humane Souls, according to the prevailing Opinions of *Paganism*, are given by those two great Poets *Homer* and *Virgil*.

Homer's Description is very plain, and agreeable to the Simplicity of that early Age. He supposes the Humane Soul to be nothing but refined Matter, capable of Pleasure by feasting on the Steam of the Blood of Sacrifices, and likewise of all the Variety of Torments from Instruments of Torture in a future State.

Virgil disposes of departed Souls (after their receiving Sentence from the Infernal Judges) either in a Sort
of


ESSAY of *Purgatory*, or in *Tartarus*, or in
IV. the *Elysian* Fields.

~ The Pains and Purifications of his *Purgatory* are described as of short Duration: After which the purified Souls, having spent a Thousand Years in *Elysium*, and drunk of the River *Lethe* or Oblivion, are said by him to return to live in other Bodies upon Earth.

The Punishments of *Tartarus* he represents as eternal, and as consisting in all Kinds of Torture.

The Happiness of the *Elysian* Fields he describes by pleasant Groves, Songs, and all such diverting Exercises as the happy Souls affected most in the present Life.

The Opinion of eternal Punishment in a future State, is pretended by the Poet *Lucretius* to have been the Original of all Religion. Which seems to argue it to have been both very Ancient and General. But whether such Punishment was generally supposed to be the Demerit of every Offence, or only of some more flagitious Actions, may be doubted. *Virgil*, 'tis certain, inflicts eternal Punishments on none but the open Contemners of the Gods, Betrayers of their Country, and other Offenders of the first Rank: The lesser Offenders
he

he sends to be bleach'd in the Winds, Essay
 to be wash'd in a vast Gulf, or else IV:
 to be refined by Fire in his *Purgatory*. 

This Poet supposes the Earth to be extended like a Floor; of which he conceives, the Heaven (the Seat of the Gods, and of so much of the Demi-Gods as was Divine) to be the Roof. Under this Floor he supposes a vast Hollow, divided into several Apartments, in which he places not only *Tartarus* or Hell, but *Purgatory*, and the *Elysian* Fields, or the Seats of Happy Souls. *Tartarus* he represents to be as a Fortification moated round with a Lake of Fire, and encompass'd with a triple Wall, supported by Pillars of Adamant, not to be demolished by the united Force of all the Gods. Within this Place he supposes a vast Abyss, sunk twice as deep below the Surface of the Earth as the Heaven is raised above it; which Abyss he makes the Scene of the most dreadful and durable Torments.

Though this whole Description is purely Imaginary, as to Particulars, yet in the General, 'tis so far founded on Truth, as it supposes, what Reason upon the most solid Grounds admits, viz: That it will hereafter be

R

well


ESSAY well with the Good, and ill with the
 IV. Bad, in a just Proportion to their
 ~~~~~ Conduct in the present Life. It was  
 likewise so far beneficial to Mankind,  
 at that Time, as it served to deter  
 from Vice and recommend Virtue,  
 and as it represented to the discern-  
 ing Eye, in the particular Accounts  
 of those Imaginary Future Punish-  
 ments, the real and natural Conse-  
 quences of Vice even in the present  
 State. Thus when the Earth-sprung  
 Giants, who attempted to scale Hea-  
 ven, were said to be sunk below all  
 others in the vast Abyss, it served to  
 remind Men, that a Fall naturally  
 follows Pride and Ambition, and that  
 the higher one aspires to undeserved  
 Honour, the lower he may be plung'd  
 into Shame and Contempt. The like  
 Morals might also be drawn from the  
 Fables of *Tantalus*, *Ixion*, *Sisyphus*  
 and others.

## S E C T. XII.

Though the Books of the *Jewish*  
 Religion contain, as we believe, a  
 Divine Revelation, yet we find in them  
 no very particular Descriptions either  
 of the Final State of Happiness or of  
 Punishment; and the short Hints they  
 give are plainly figurative.

*Topbet*



*Tophet* is said to have been prepared ESSAY  
of Old, and is described as a Place of IV.  
Torment by Fire. 'Tis likewise, said   
that *they that turn many unto Righteous-*  
*ness, shall shine as the Stars,* and that *the*  
*Wicked, at the Resurrection, shall a-*  
*wake to Shame and everlasting Con-*  
*tempt,* Dan. xii.

But 'tis well known, *Tophet* or the  
Valley of *Hinnom* (from whence the  
*Γέεννα* or *Gehenna*, which signifies *Hell*  
in the *New Testament*, is derived)  
was the Place where Children were  
sacrificed by Fire to the Idol *Moloch*.  
The dreadful Solemnities of that Place,  
were therefore used as a fit Emblem  
or Figure of the Final State of Punish-  
ment.

'Tis likewise certain, that the  
Brightness of Stars, being what so a-  
greeably strikes the Eye, can be no  
unfit Emblem of Future Exaltation  
and Glory.

*Shame* and *Contempt*, since they  
cannot be supposed to have any Place  
in the Final State of Punishment, must  
also be look'd upon as Figurative.  
For *Shame* is too nearly allied to Mo-  
desty and Repentance to gain Admit-  
tance among those whom Despair, and  
the Custom of Sinning must be suppo-  
sed to have harden'd to the last De-

ESSAY gree. And as for *Contempt*, it can properly have no place with those who being in the same State of Unhappiness, can have no temptation to exercise any Contempt of others; which can proceed from nothing but Difference of State or Circumstances, or some Inequality either real or supposed. And to imagine that either the Divine Being or Good Spirits should, in a proper Sense, condemn the unhappy Sufferers, would be to attribute that to them which is very unworthy of them. For Contempt is nearly allied to Pride and Insolence.

Therefore those Ideas of Final Happiness and Unhappiness, which are given us by the *Jewish* Revelation, being only Figurative, can import no more than that General Dictate of Reason aforementioned, *viz.* It will be well with the Good and ill with the Bad in a just Proportion; (at least) to their Conduct in the present State.

### S E C T. XIII.

The *Mahometan* Account of the future Happiness and Unhappiness of Humane Souls, if meant in a proper Sense, is very Gross and Sensual, and is confess'd, even by *Avicenna*, a noted *Mahometan* Philosopher; to be far from

from agreeable to the Dictates of Reason. The Happiness of the Future State, according to that pretended Revelation, consists in the Enjoyment of Magnificent Palaces, Flowery Fields and beautiful Gardens planted with Trees of Gold bearing most delicious Fruit; as likewise in the Pleasures of Feasting and the Conversation of beautiful Virgins in Shady Groves and by the Sides of purling Streams. The Account of the Unhappiness and Misery of that State is, that the Wicked shall be tormented with Fire and scalding Water and stung by Serpents bigger than Camels; and that when burnt and turn'd to Coals, they shall be rais'd again for fresh Torments.

We need only remark here, that the *Mahometan* Account of Future Punishment by Fire is partly taken from the Letter of the preceding Descriptions. For 'tis well known that *Mahomet* borrow'd most of his Doctrines from the more Ancient Schemes of Religion.

## S E C T. XIV.

We may now proceed to consider the Accounts of the Final State of Happiness and Misery afforded us  
by

ESSAY by *Christianity*, the clearest and fullest,  
 IV. est, though not the last Institution of  
 ~~~~~ Religion.

Though neither the Old nor the New Testament speaks so clearly of any Particular Abodes of Souls in an *Intermediate* State, yet *Heaven* and *Hell* are very plainly represented as particular Places of Abode, not as States only. The New Testament especially is very express in asserting a Distinction of Places in the Final State: And in this it has the Suffrage of Reason. For agreeable Society is certainly a very considerable part of Happiness, and Company that is disagreeable very much enhances Misery. Which Reason is likewise equally strong to prove a Distinction of Places even in the Intermediate State, if any such State be admitted.

The Place of Final Happiness is generally agreed by Christians to be the Empyrean Heaven, beyond the Fix'd Stars. But the Place of Misery is disputed; only it's Situation is agreed to be somewhere *beneath* or *below*.

As for the Duration of the State of Final Happiness, though we have the greatest Reason to set aside Merit, yet no Man can make any Difficulty to believe

believe it will be Eternal: For sure no Man will seek to abridge the Divine Goodness. But as to the particular Kinds of Happiness in that State, we are much at a loss: And no wonder, since the Christian Revelation itself tells us that the Glory of the Final State of Happiness is a thing yet *to be reveal'd*, and that it *doth not yet appear what we shall be*. From whence we may conclude that the Present State affords no Ideas, or at least, none that are adæquate to the Fruition of that State. Accordingly, 'tis said, *Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, neither hath it entered into the Heart of Man to conceive the things that God hath prepared for those that love him*, so that what the same Revelation tells us elsewhere of *Crowns, Palms of Victory, Rivers of Pleasure*, and the like, can be only Figurative. And certainly the Vision of the *Face of God*, which the Christian Revelation speaks of as the Perfection of Celestial Happiness, must likewise be own'd to be no more than Figurative.

Yet this last Expression, as we may observe, has a Tendency to direct us to place the Perfection of Future Happiness in Intellectual Pleasures. For *seeing the Face of God*, though Figurative,

ESSAY Figurative, can import no less than
IV. this, that we shall hereafter enjoy a
much clearer Knowledge of the Nature of God than at present.

But, probably, as the Notions of *Mahomet* with regard to Future Happiness are too gross and sensual, so, on the contrary, the Notions of some Christian Divines, who place the Celestial Happiness purely in Contemplation and Praise, are too much refined. For as both our External and Internal Sensations have been observ'd to proceed from one and the same Perceptive Faculty, 'tis not unreasonable to think that the Perceptive Faculty, in it's full Latitude, will be gratified in every suitable Manner, even to the utmost Extent of our present regular Wishes and Desires. And not only so, but that it will, as we before observ'd, be gratified with other Sensations which, at present, we know nothing of. And as Affections follow Sensations, no doubt but they will be likewise satisfied, in all innocent Manners, with agreeable Company (not excluding that of our former Friends) as well as with the most agreeable Objects; which seems to be meant by the Expression of *Sitting down*

down with ABRAHAM, ISAAC and JACOB in the Kingdom of Heaven. ESSAY
IV.


It may here be queried, Whether Knowledge, and the Intellectual Pleasure it yields, will in the Final State of Happiness be at once brought to the utmost Perfection, according to the several Capacities, or whether it will gradually increase.

In answer to this, it may be observed, That our Knowledge consists not merely in an Insight into the Natures, but mostly in a View of the Relations and Dependences of Things. But a bare superficial Prospect of the mutual Dependences of the Almighty's Works of Wisdom and Power (setting aside a thorough Insight into their several Natures) would probably be too large to be distinctly taken at once by any created Being. That therefore which may be more perfectly acquir'd by Degrees, will not (as we have Reason to believe) be less perfectly infus'd at once. And this is the rather to be believ'd, because we are told there are *Things which even the Angels desire to look into*. Our Happiness therefore will very probably be so far from being inconsistent with Increase of Knowledge, that it will partly result from it. But if this

ESSAY be true with regard to the Knowledge
 IV. of the Creator's Works, how much
 ~~~~~ more must it be so with regard  
 to the Knowledge of the Nature of the  
 Great Creator Himself? Increase of  
 Knowledge is therefore very consist-  
 ent with all the Happiness that Hu-  
 mane Nature in its most exalted State  
 is capable of. We shall indeed be *made*  
*Perfect* (as the Scripture says) but we  
 shall still be Men. We shall *see God*  
*as He is*, but so as the Eyes of our  
 Minds are capable of Viewing Him.

What has been observ'd of the par-  
 ticular Descriptions of Heaven or the  
 Place of Final Happiness, may like-  
 wise be remark'd of those of the Place  
 of Final Misery; which Misery is like-  
 wise represented as of eternal Dura-  
 tion. The Descriptions, of it are figura-  
 tive, and taken from such Things as  
 the present State affords. The most  
 shocking Ideas we are acquainted with  
 are excited, to deter us from Sin, the  
 greatest of Evils. We read of *the*  
*Worm that never dies*, and of *unquen-*  
*able Fire*. But the Idea of *Fire*, be-  
 ing taken from the Elementary Fire  
 in the Valley of *Hinnom*, and join'd  
 with the Idea of *Worms*, which is  
 plainly Figurative, we may very rea-  
 sonably

sonably be supposed to be likewise ESSAY  
IV.  
Figurative.

We read indeed of Elementary   
Fire, which, at the Second Coming  
of Christ, will *devour or destroy the  
Wicked*, 2 Pet. ii. 12. Heb. x. 27. But  
this appears to be meant of Fire which  
will destroy the Bodies of such wick-  
ed Men who shall be found alive at  
that Time, but not of eternal Fire.  
Some ancient Fathers held indeed a  
Fire of Tryal, for manifesting the  
Works of all that shall have lived  
upon Earth both Good and Bad,  
grounding their Opinion on 1 Cor.  
iii. 13. explain'd by Mark ix. 4, 9.  
*Every one shall be salted with Fire,  
and every Sacrifice shall be salted with  
Salt.* But as they pleaded no Tradi-  
tion for this Interpretation, we have  
the more room to think they took  
in a literal Sense, what was meant on-  
ly in a figurative. For besides that  
*Salt*, which is here join'd with *Fire*,  
cannot bear a proper Sense, it must  
be allow'd that Fire, though a very  
proper Instrument to try Metals, is  
a very unfit one to try the Hearts or  
Consciences of Men.

To conclude, All that we can with  
Reason infer from the Descriptions  
of the Final States of Humane Souls,



ESSAY is, that it will be well with the Good  
IV. in such manner as suits the Goodness  
of God, and ill with the Bad in a just  
Proportion to the Demerits of their  
Crimes.

As for the Demerits of Crimes, we have spoken of them in a former Treatise; for which Reason we shall be brief. What is proper to be here added seems to be this. 'Tis reasonable to think that the greater Demerit of an Offence (consider'd without regard to Civil Institution) doth not proceed from the greater Quality of the Person offended (for that, in some Cases, may make it less, as it renders him less capable of suffering Detriment) but from the greater Personal Obligations of the Offender, and from the greater Sense he had of his Obligations at the Time he committed the Offence. Accordingly, an Offence against a mean Person to whom I have particular Obligations, is greater than an Offence against a Prince to whom I have none but what I have to the rest of Mankind in common And an Offence at a Time when I have a lively Sense of any Favour or Obligation, is plainly more aggravated than when the Sense of it is worn off.


If



If therefore, (by parity of Reason) Offences committed against the Divine Being are concluded to be the most heinous of all others, it proceeds not immediately from the Perfection of his Nature (for that renders him incapable of receiving or suffering any Detriment) but from the Nature of our Obligations to Him; which are certainly the greatest of any.

Consequently, whatever positive Punishment there maybe in the Final State of Misery, it will be duly proportioned to the Obligations of the Offenders, and to their Sense of those Obligations to the Divine Being. Which Obligations and their Sense of them, since they will appear to have been very different (as well as the Facts committed) therefore the Degrees of positive Punishment we must suppose will be no less different.

But tho' the Degrees will be different, yet the Duration of the Punishments may be the same. For certainly the Great Judge of the World may justly exclude all those from Happiness for ever, who knowingly act contrary to the Duties on the Performance of which their Happiness was justly suspended.



A N  
E S S A Y  
O N  
C R E A T I O N.

S E C T. I.

ESSAY  
V.



*S* the *Christian Revelation* first brought *Life and Immortality to light*, or yielded the clearest and most convincing Proofs of the Humane Soul's Immortality and Reunion to an Immortal Body, so the *Jewish* Revelation gave us the first Notice of our entire Dependence, with respect to Existence, Life and Immortality, on One Eternal, Independent Source of all Things. In both Cases, Revelation has taught us to soar to a Pitch above the sublimest Speculations

Speculations of mere Philosophy, by encouraging us in an unwearied Search after the rational Proofs of these two most important Doctrines, of the Truth and Certainty of which it had given us such previous Assurance.

Tho' something hath been already said in a former Treatise, with respect to our Dependence on One Eternal Being as our Creator, yet the Bounds I had then prescribed to myself, being too narrow, 'tis hoped it will be forgiven me, if I here resume and enlarge on a Subject which is the very Basis of true Religion. In so doing I shall be forced to omit that very popular and copious Argument taken from the Signatures or Tokens of Wisdom and Design to be observ'd in the Structure of the Universe, not only because it has been sufficiently treated of elsewhere \*, but chiefly because it doth not immediately affect the most numerous Sect of Unbelievers; I mean the *Spinozists*.

*Creation* may signify the Production either of a new *Form* or of a new *Substance*.

That the World receiv'd a new *Form*, or that it was form'd out of a *Chaos* or indigested Heap of Matter by

\* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 74, &c.

ESSAY by a most Wise and Powerful Cause,  
 V. was generally believ'd by the more  
 ~~~~~ Ancient *Greeks* and others, who it  
 seems receiv'd that Doctrine by Tradition from the most early Ages. And even such among the *Greeks*, who denied the Existence of any such Cause were notwithstanding (many of them) convinc'd that the present Form of the Universe was not Eternal, tho' they ascrib'd it to *Chance*; which was no Cause, but a mere Notion made up of Blindness and Impotence.

ARGUMENT I.

Of this, the Poet *Lucretius* is an unexceptionable Witness, who tho' an Atheistical *Atomist*, argues from *the late Beginning of History*, that the present Form or Figure of the World had a Beginning.

The *Greeks*, 'tis confess'd, from whose Histories *Lucretius* takes his Argument, are allow'd to have been none of the most Ancient Nations; their Historical Period, according to *Varro*, beginning but with the first reviv'd *Olympiad*, which was not till the World, according to *Moses's* Account, was about Three thousand Years old. Some indeed allow that their Historical Period began about
 two

two Centuries earlier, viz. at the Destruction of *Troy*, which was about Two thousand eight hundred Years later than the *Mosaick Epocha*. ESSAY V.

But tho', according to the *Mosaick Account*, the Age of the World is little short of Six thousand Years (which Account is not only much earlier than any credible Account of Time to be met with in the *Grecian Histories*; but goes higher than the Histories of most other Nations) yet how short is the Space of Six thousand Years!

It must indeed be confess'd, that three several Nations have pretended to a much earlier Account of Time than even this of *Moses*; viz. the *Assyrians*, the *Egyptians* and the *Chinese*. But the Vanity of their Pretensions may appear from the following Observations.

That the Pretensions of the *Assyrians* were vain may be concluded from hence, That *Calisthenes* going with *Alexander* the Great to the Conquest of *Persia*, and being desired by *Aristotle* to search into the Antiquities of *Babylon* preserv'd by the *Chaldeans* (who were, at that Time, a Sort of *Babylonish* Philosophers) writ back, That after the most diligent Enquiry, he could find no Ac-

T

count

ESSAY count of above One thousand nine
 V. hundred and three Years; which Years
 appear to have begun with *Ninus* the
 Son of *Belus* their first King *, agreeably to the *Mosaick* Account.

As for the Account of the *Egyptians*, we are assur'd, that it did not exceed the *Chaldean* Account above Sixty-seven Years. 'Tis likewise certain, they were a People guilty of extreme Vanity, and infinitely addicted to Fables: And their History, published by *Menetho* and pretending to so great Antiquity, made its first Appearance (as well as the *Chaldean* History of *Berosus*) at or near the Time of *Ptolomy Philadelphus*, when the *Old Testament* was translated into *Greek*, and was probably forged (in part at least) in Opposition to the *Mosaick* Account of Time.

As for the *Chinese* Account, the Difference between that and the Account of *Moses*, has been sufficiently adjusted by allowing for the Difference of the Years, and it has been found to extend no farther than Four thousand odd hundred Solar Years backward. 'Tis likewise not well to be supposed that either the *Chaldeans*,
Egyptians,

* Vid. Loc. Calisthenis ap. Simpl. & Arist. 2do. de Cælo.

Egyptians or *Chineſe*, if they had made Astronomical Calculations ſo many Thouſands of Years as they pretend, could have remain'd ſo long ignorant of the true Theory of the Planetary Motions, and of the exact Method of calculating Eclypſes.

ESSAY

V.

But if the Hiſtories and Polity of theſe moſt Ancient Nations were of ſo late Originals, what can it ſo reaſonably be aſcrib'd to as to the late Original of Mankind and of this Terreſtrial Frame of Things?

ARGUMENT II.

Add to this *the late Invention of Writing and Chronology* (without which Hiſtory could not well be preſerved or diſtinctly underſtood) together with the late Beginning of all other uſeful Arts and Sciences, and it will ſtill amount to a ſtronger Proof of the late Formation of this Terreſtrial Globe.

As for the Art of *Writing*; 'tis highly probable that *Mofes* was the firſt Introducer of Letters as well as the firſt Writer of Hiſtory. This ſeems to be confirm'd by the general Report of Hiſtorians, who agree that from *Phœnicia* Letters were original derived. Accordingly, the *Greeks* call'd their Letters, *φωινικῆα γράμματα*, *Phœni-*

ESSAY *cian* Letters, because first introduced
 V. among them by *Cadmus* a *Phœnician*
 or *Canaanite*; who is supposed to have
 borrowed them from the *Jews*.

As for *Chronology*, 'tis certain that the greatest Part of the World were long ignorant of it: Or if they had any Notion of it, it was shewn in reckoning by Months or else by Years arbitrarily composed of more or fewer Months. The first Computation of the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians* was by single Months, and afterwards by Years of four Months each *. The *Roman* Year consisted first of ten Months, and afterwards of twelve. The *Chinese* first reckoned single Months, as did the *Arabians*, *Americans* and others, till the Revolutions of the Sun (or rather of the Earth) became better understood. But that was not till very late. The first who reduced the differing Computations of Time to any tolerable Regularity and Exactness, was *Meton*, who invented the famous Period of nineteen Years, call'd the *Golden Number*.

The Names of the reputed first Inventors of most other Arts and Sciences are not only preserv'd, but are, many of them fresh in the Memories of the grateful Part of Mankind:
 And

* Plutarch
 in vita Nu-
 mæ.

And the Progress and gradual Improvement of all useful Knowledge may be traced in History within the Compass of Six thousand Years.

ESSAY
V.

ARGUMENT III.

Add to this, *the Gradual Increase of Mankind*, and it will further corroborate the Assertion of the late Formation of this Terrestrial Globe. It has been observ'd, that the Number of Mankind (notwithstanding the ordinary Casualties of Wars, Famines, Pestilence and other Calamities) is usually doubled in the Space of three or four Hundred Years. Examples may be produced of such Increase out of the *Jewish, Grecian and Roman Histories*. But admitting an Increase of but one Person in an Age, the Increase of Mankind in an eternal Series of Ages, must have been so great as not only to have overstock'd the Earth, but (could a Passage have been found) to have replenish'd all the habitable Parts of the Universe, tho' it had been Millions of times more extensive than it is: For the greatest imaginable Extension bears no Proportion to a suppos'd actually infinite Increase.

Some will here have recourse to universal Deluges for reducing the Numbers

ESSAY bers of Mankind from time to time.

V. But as these cannot be supposed with
 ~~~~~ out a miraculous Interposition of some  
 Power superior to Nature, in order ei-  
 ther to the bringing on or carrying off  
 the Waters, and of a Providence, in  
 order to the Preservation of some of  
 the Humane Race from so general  
 Calamities ; such a Supposition can  
 be of no Service to the Cause of our  
 Adversaries.

#### ARGUMENT IV.

As Mankind gradually increase in  
 Number, so *Mountains* gradually *De-  
 crease* both in Bulk and Height :  
 Which, if it be not a further Proof  
 of the *late Original*, is at least, a  
 good Argument against the *Eternity*  
 of the present Form of the Earth.

Certain Hills and Mountains fa-  
 mous in History, are observed to  
 have been higher and bulkier than  
 at present ; and the same may be con-  
 cluded in some Degree of all others.  
 Their Decrease both in Bulk and  
 Height, may be ascrib'd partly to  
 the Force of the Winds, and part-  
 ly to the Washing of the Rains and  
 Torrents, which wear their Tops and  
 Sides, and carry down Quantities of  
 Earth, and sometimes vast Rocks, in-  
 to



to the Vallies. It may likewise have happen'd through the Decay of the Texture of the Materials of which they consist. For vast Slices of the *Alps* and other rugged Mountains, have been known to fall off merely by their own Weight (as happen'd at the Destruction of the Town of *Pleurs* near *Chavennes*) without any perceivable external Cause ; which could be ascrib'd to nothing but an internal Decay. Now these Gaps and Hollows in the Sides of Mountains, and the Diminutions made on their Tops, are never fill'd up or repair'd by any internal Principle of Growth, as far as can be observ'd. But if so, then the Causes having been always the same, the Mountains in a Succession of infinite Ages, must have been entirely levell'd. Which since it hath not happen'd, we may firmly conclude, that the present Form of this Globe of the Earth was not from Eternity.

To these Arguments, which regard the Earth only, I shall add two others ; one of which regards the whole Solar System, the other the entire visible Universe.

## ESSAY

## V.

## ARGUMENT V.



No possible Addition can render any Number actually infinite or absolutely Great, *i. e.* so Great as to make it Absolutely Impossible or Contradictory for it to become Greater. An Actually Infinite Number is therefore too Absurd to be supposed. Yet supposing an Actually Infinite or Absolutely Great Number, it would be still more palpably Absurd to suppose it to be exceeded by another Number.

But both these Absurdities must be believed, if we suppose the Present Form or Frame of the Solar System to have been from Eternity. For Instance. The Revolutions of the Planet *Saturn* about the Sun, each of which is perform'd in the Space of about Thirty Years, must, if from Eternity, have been Actually Infinite in Number, notwithstanding that continual Additions are made. But the Revolutions of the *Moon* about the Earth, each of which is perform'd in Twenty eight Days, must, if from Eternity too, have been vastly greater in Number than the Revolutions of *Saturn*; and so one Actually Infinite or Absolutely Great Number must have vastly, nay Infinitely, exceeded another

another, contrary to what was before observ'd. ESSAY  
V.

If it be said, that the Revolutions of *Saturn* have not been more in Number (though greater Additions have been eternally made to them) than those of the *Moon*: I answer, This, to say no more, is very absurd, and a most fruitless Attempt to change the very Nature of Number, which consists in being Proportionable and Increaseable by Addition.

But if there can be no actually Infinite Number, and if, supposing such a Number, it cannot be exceeded by any other Number, it follows, that the present Form or Frame of the Solar System, and the Planetary Motions could not be from Eternity.

#### ARGUMENT VI.

Lastly. If the Form of the entire visible Universe was Eternal, it was absolutely Necessary, or it was absolutely Impossible it should have been otherwise than it was and is. For Eternity and absolute Necessity, with regard both to Existence and Essence, are the very same. But what was absolutely Necessary, or so Necessary as to render it Impossible for it not to have been, or been otherwise than it

U

was

ESSAY was and is, must both have been, and

V. still be absolutely Unchangeable. But  
~~~~ since our Experience will not suffer us to ascribe such Unchangeableness to the Form of the Visible Universe, consequently, we ought not to ascribe to it Eternity or absolute Necessity.

Not to repeat the mentioned Changes in the Surface of this Globe of the Earth, which, had they been gradually increasing from Eternity, would have quite altered the Form of it, 'tis certain that even that glorious Body which is as the Soul of this whole Planetary System, has not been free from remarkable and almost fatal Changes; Changes that cannot with the least Colour of Reason be pretended to have proceeded from Perfection, but which evidently imported Imperfection. Such was that Change that happen'd about the time of the Death of *Julius Cæsar* (mentioned by *Pliny*) when both its Light and Heat were so debilitated, for the Space of almost a Year, that the Stars were seen at Noon-day, and the Fruits of the Earth were scarce ripen'd. And such another Change in the *Sun* is recorded to have happen'd in the Reign of the Emperor *Justinian*.

Whether



Whether these *Phænomena* proceeded from Evaporations from its own Body, or from some other Cause, 'tis certain that surprizing Changes happened in that great Luminary. And considering the Number and Bigness of its *Maculæ* or Spots, which in all Probability are not natural, but have grown by Degrees on its Surface, it needs not seem strange that some have been apprehensive that, in time, it will be totally cover'd with a thick Crust, to the utter Destruction of our Planetary System.

Add to these Changes in the *Sun*, the total disappearing of divers of the Fix'd Stars after having been visible many Ages: Which, whether it happened through the Incrustation of their Surfaces or otherwise, affords a sufficient Proof that the Form of the Heavenly Bodies is imperfect and subject to Change, and that therefore it hath not been from Eternity. The undoubted Consequence of which is, that (since *Chance* is now entirely out of the Question) they were form'd by some Eternal Being; who necessarily possessed the Perfection of Liberty, or the Power of acting discretionally, with regard to other Beings, without any Change in Himself,

ESSAY whose Nature it was ever to be
V. Self-active.

SECT. II.

This leads us directly to the Consideration of the other Notion of Creation, *viz.* that of the Production of a new Substance.

By the Creation or Production of a new Substance, or of a new Subject of peculiar Attributes, no more is meant than this : That whereas from Eternity there was nothing but the Divine or Absolutely Independent BEING, He by the free Exercise of his Absolutely Independent Power caus'd Something which was not before to Be.

In considering this Notion of Creation, we may regard it either as *Possible* or *Certain*.

The *Possibility* of the Creation or Production of a New Substance (or a New Subject of peculiar Attributes) may appear.

First, from the Creation or Production of New Forms or Modes, already demonstrated. For if these are not mere Nothings, then Something was newly created when they were produced. Thus when the *Moon* first began her Circuit about the *Earth* (for
we

we have proved it could not be from Eternity) a New Motion was created or produced, which was Something that was not before. And thus, even now, when the Particles of Wood become Flame, something is produced that was not. But if Creation is not impossible or repugnant in a less Degree; it may not be impossible in a greater Degree.

Secondly, From the Existence of an Eternal Being.

That there is Something which was from Eternity, is one of the most evident Truths in Nature. To deny it would be to affirm the grossest Absurdity, *viz.* That Something began to be without any Cause at all.

Now, it is certain that every Thing that exists (or is) must have either a Cause or at least, a Reason or Support of its Existence or Being. But as a Cause that bestows Existence (if there be any such) must include in itself Power, so must a Reason or Support of Existence include or imply Power. Thus says *Seneca*, (tho' a *Pantheist*) *Deus sustinet se vi sua*, * i. e. God supports or sustains himself by his own Power.

Therefore

* In *Quæst. Nat. Lib. II. cap. 1.*

ESSAY Therefore (by *Seneca's* Confession)

V. since the Support of the Existence of
 ~~~~~ the Eternal Being must be within  
 Himself, He cannot but have Power  
 in Himself. But that Power of the  
 Eternal Being which is the Support of  
 his Existence; may certainly be the  
 Cause of the Existence of Other Be-  
 ings. For the supporting or sustain-  
 ing of Existence cannot but be equi-  
 valent to the bestowing it.

This Power of the Eternal Being  
 which is ever Active and sustains  
 his Existence hath disposed some to  
 stile Him *His own Cause*. And this  
 Manner of speaking even *Spinoza*, the  
 famous modern *Pantheist*, has thought  
 fit to conform to.

Again, (to draw another Proof  
 from this) when we say that the E-  
 ternal Being hath a Power of sup-  
 porting or sustaining his own Exi-  
 stence, we say that his Power is Per-  
 fect, or Absolutely Independent both  
 in Existing and in Acting. For the  
 sustaining Himself by his own Power  
 includes both these Notions of Inde-  
 pendence. But when we say, the  
 Eternal Being hath the Power of  
 Creating or Producing a New Sub-  
 stance from Nothing, we say no more  
 than, as before, that his Power is  
 Absolutely

absolutely Independent in Acting. For as it cannot be absolutely Independent in Acting, if the Effect of its Acting necessarily depends on any thing but itself, it therefore doth not necessarily require or depend on any Materials to act upon: Which is the same as to say, it can create from Nothing.

ESSAY  
V.

Thirdly, From the Notion of a Contradictory, Repugnant or Inconsistent Proposition. All such Propositions import Being and not Being, Something and Nothing, at the same Time and in the same Manner. But if so, then a Thing's not Being and Being at *different* Times is not a Contradiction, Repugnance or Inconsistence. Therefore the Creation of a New Substance from Nothing is possible to a Power that is Perfect, or that extends to every Action that implies not a Contradiction, Repugnance or Inconsistency.

## SECT. III.

These Arguments (if I mistake not) plainly demonstrate the *Possibility*; the *Certainty* of the Creation of a New Substance from Nothing will appear.


1<sup>st</sup>, From

ESSAY 1<sup>st</sup>, From the Perfection of the  
 V. Nature of the Eternal Independent  
 Being, compared with the Imperfec-  
 tion of the Nature of the Visible  
 Universe.

To be able to Exist Eternally or Independently, or without the Influence or Causality of Another, is the highest Degree of Sufficiency. But the highest Degree of Sufficiency cannot but include the most perfect Power, and where there is the most perfect Power, there can be no Defect or Imperfection, because every Defect argues Impotence or Want of Power.

But where shall we find the Tokens of this most perfect Power? What Proof can the Whole Visible Universe yield us of the real Existence of such a Power, otherwise than by convincing us by its Defects of its absolute Inability to Exist but a single Moment independently of such a Power in some Superiour Being? The Passive Nature of all its Parts (big with many other Imperfections) is such a Defect as is diametrically opposite to the Nature of perfect Power, and consequently to independent Existence. If they move, 'tis because they are moved: For as they cannot change  
 the



the Direction of their Motions, 'tis ESSAY  
sufficiently plain that they have nei- V.  
ther Power nor Liberty to move   
themselves. Could the Planets but  
suspend their Courses round the Sun  
for the Space but of one of their Re-  
volutions, or could a Stone, by  
changing it's Course, return to the  
Hand that slung it, we might have  
Cause to think they had a Power of  
Self-motion. But as this never hap-  
pens nor is even pretended to be  
possible by the *Hobbiſts* and *Spinoſiſts*  
themselves, (who ſuppoſe an Eternal  
Circulation of Motion ) we may  
conclude the Parts of Matter, and  
the Whole which they compoſe, are  
merely Paſſive and Impotent.

Befides, if we make an Analyſis  
of any particular Body or Portion of  
Matter, what do we find but a Heap  
of Duſt? So that even the Sun,  
Moon and all the viſible Stars may  
juſtly be reputed but ſo many ſmall  
Parcels of Duſt ſcatter'd here and  
there along the vaſt Expanſion ; being  
much leſs in Proportion to the Space  
of the Viſible Heavens, which they  
ſeem almoſt to fill, than the Fiſhes  
are to the Ocean. For certainly they  
are not in Themſelves more Noble,  
than the Matter of which they con-  
ſiſt.

ESSAY fifth. They receive all their Great-  
 V. ness and Beauty from their Composition, and shine with Glories not  
 ~~~~~ their own.

But if the entire Visible Universe be so mean and inconsiderable, what shall we think of a single Atom or Particle, that hath scarce any thing more than Form or Figure to distinguish it from Nothing? Yet such a diminutive, impotent thing as a single Particle hath as good a Claim to Eternal Existence as the Whole System of Matter.

From what has been here observed of the Impotent and Passive Nature of Matter, join'd with its other Imperfections, we may firmly conclude that it was not from Eternity.

— 1. Because being void of all Power, it has no Support of its Existence within itself, as an Eternal Being cannot but have; and,

2. Because, being Imperfect in so many Respects, it can be no absolute Impossibility or Repugnance for it to become imperfect in other Respects: Which is directly contrary to the Nature of an Eternal or Necessarily Existent Being; for such a Being, as it cannot but be Perfect, so it cannot without an Absolute Repugnance

pugnance be supposed subject to the Possibility of existing otherwise than it actually and necessarily exists.

ESSAY
V.



But if Matter was not from Eternity, 'tis certain that it once began to Be, or that it was created from Nothing.

2. Another Proof of the Certainty of the Creation of a New Substance from Nothing, may be derived from the actual *Penetration* of the Whole Visible Universe by a Substance or Nature that is more Perfect.

Such a Penetration appears very clearly from the Nature of *Gravitation*, or the Tendency of Bodies towards some or other Centre.

'Tis certain, that the several Parts of the Visible Universe do not gravitate, or tend towards their Centers, in an exact Proportion to the Extent of their Surface, but only according to their solid Contents or real Bulk, or the Number of the Particles of which they consist. That this cannot proceed from any necessary independent Power, inherent in their Particles, is plain; because their Gravitation always varies according to different Situations, as is well known. 'Tis likewise plain that their Gravitation and its Variation being both in a just

ESSAY Proportion to their solid Contents or
V. the Number of their Particles, cannot depend upon any Cause whose Substance and Power are not every where the same, or which doth not penetrate the Bulk of their Particles. There is therefore something that pervades the very Substance of the Material Universe, and which possesses, as it were, its very Nature, impressing and regulating the Natural Motions of its several Parts according to their different Situations.

But whence proceeded this Superiority and, as it were, Propriety of one Being over and in another? Natures that are both of them supposed eternal or equally necessary with Regard to Existence, could have no natural Inequality with Regard to Perfection. For the Eternal Necessity being simple, or not diversified by any præ-existent Will, could not be the Foundation of Inequality of Perfection in divers Beings. Consequently, the less perfect Substance or Being could not be Eternal or Absolutely Necessary with regard to Existence, but must have once begun to Be, or must have been created from Nothing by the more Perfect and Superior Substance.

Such

Such a Penetration farther appears ESSAY
from the Nature of *Distance*. V.

According to the *Newtonian* Philosophy, that vast Space or Expansion in which the neighbouring great Bodies of the Universe move, is for the far greater Part, void of Matter. But as that Space is the Foundation of the wide Distances between the mentioned Bodies, it cannot be deem'd a pure Nothing. For Bodies that have Nothing between them cannot but meet and coalesce or join together. Yet at the same Time, the mention'd Space or Expansion, though it be a Something sufficient to cause the Distances between those Bodies, is nevertheless no manner of Impediment to their Motions. But what surer Proof than this can there be of a Penetration of those Bodies by the Space or Expansion?

This All Penetrating Expansion is, I doubt not, a very great Reality, and far from resembling a Shadow against the Wall, as some vainly suggest. For a Shadow is only Darkness or a mere Privation of Light, and has no real Dimensions distinct from those of the Wall itself; much less is it (as was observed) a pure Nothing or Creature
of

ESSAY of Imagination. For certainly pure
 V. Nothing cannot have Dimensions, or
 be really measurable by Miles or Semidiameters of the Earth.

But if the Reality of an All-penetrating or most Perfect Expansion be so evidently demonstrable, it clearly follows, that it cannot be unworthy the Idea of the most Perfect of Beings; for as much as the most perfect Nature cannot but include whatever imports Reality and Perfection, in the most perfect possible Manner.

Lastly, Such a Penetration appears from the firm *Cohesion* of the Parts of some compound Bodies. Thus, when a Fluid Body becomes the Substance of a Plant or a Stone, its Particles, which were before in a manner loose from each other, become as it were cemented together. But by what Cement? 'Tis certain that the Figures of the minutest Particles still remain the same: And if the Cohesion and Union of divers of those Particles have form'd them into hooked Figures which take hold of each other, yet from whence proceed the Cohesion and Union of those minutest Particles? What was and is the Band of their Union? Was it (as the *Cartesians* suppose

suppose) nothing else but the mutual Rest of those Particles which were before in Motion? But Rest has no more Virtue to unite, than Motion has to separate: And a very small Degree of Force is sufficient to move, and, by consequence, to separate such extremely minute Particles, tho' never so profoundly at Rest. How is it then that they cohere and unite so firmly as not to be separated without a very great Degree of Force? Is the Pressure of the external Air the Cause of it? This no Man will say: For then it would follow that all Bodies subject to an equal Pressure would be equally compact and hard; and likewise that the same Bodies, when subject to different Pressures of the Air, would be more or less hard: Which is contrary to Experience. It therefore remains that this firm Cohesion and Union of the Particles of the Plant or Stone proceed from some internal Cause. But an internal Cause of Union must be intimately present with every Part, and must, as it were, take hold of all the Particles that are united; which it cannot do without a Penetration of their Substance.

There

ESSAY There is therefore Something of a
 V. Nature superiour to the Substance of
 ~~~~~ Bodies that contains, penetrates, and,  
 as it were, possesses its very Nature :  
 And this can be no other than the  
 Substance of its Great Creator. For  
 as for that Created Hylarchick Princi-  
 ple, or Spirit of Nature, spoken of  
 by some Philosophers, 'tis reasonable  
 to think 'tis purely Imaginary, be-  
 cause 'tis absolutely Unnecessary.

3. Another Proof of the Certainty  
 of such a Creation may be form'd  
 from the *real Distinction and Plurality*  
*of Beings.*

*Spinoza*, who held, That the en-  
 tire Universe was full of Matter, and  
 that One Individual Infinite Material  
 Substance was *the ALL*, took away,  
 by consequence, all real Distinction  
 of Beings, and made every thing a  
 Part of what he call'd the One Infi-  
 nite Being. But if Distance or the  
 Separation of the Parts of Matter by  
 vast Vacuities, or Spaces void of  
 Matter be sufficient to demonstrate a  
 Distinction of Beings, we may rest  
 assured (according to the *Newtonian*  
 Principles) that the Planets and Fix-  
 ed Stars are Beings really distinct from  
 each other. And if Distance, join'd  
 with

with a distinct Consciousness, be sufficient to prove the same Distinction, *Peter at Rome* cannot be the same Being with *Paul at London*. If therefore there is a real Distinction and Plurality of Beings, from whence may we suppose it to have sprung? Was there a Free or Arbitrary Cause, or was there a Necessary or Eternal Reason of it? A Necessary or Eternal Reason there could not be: For (as we have elsewhere \* shewn) the Reason of Necessary or Eternal Existence is no less than Almighty Power join'd with all other possible Perfections; all which Perfections, being Uniform and capable of Coexisting in One and the same Being, could, by Consequence, be no Eternal or Necessary Reason of the Existence of more than One. It therefore undeniably follows, that Plurality of Beings was the Effect of a Free or Arbitrary Cause; *i. e.* the Result of Creative Power in an Eternal, Free and Almighty Being.

4. Another Proof may be derived from the *Immortal Nature of Humane Souls*.

Humane Souls, being no Compositions or Results of Compositions (as was shewn in the preceding *Essays*) and being therefore not naturally dis-

Y


sipable

\* See Preface to *Christian Religion founded on Reason*.

ESSAY *si*nable or mortal, must either have  
 V. been immediately created from No-  
 ~~~~~ thing, or else must have existed from  
 Eternity. If they existed from Eter-
 nity, can it be supposed that none of
 us should have so much as a general
 Notion of our existing in a former
 State? Though our particular Ideas
 of external Objects appear to depend
 on the Brain, yet the Idea of Exist-
 ence, and even the general Ideas of
 Happiness or Unhappiness, (as was
 before observ'd) are fix'd in the Soul.
 If therefore our Souls were capable of
 Perception, even without the Brain
 or any bodily Organ from Eternity,
 how comes it that we have no Memo-
 ry of the State in which they existed,
 and perceiv'd from Eternity? If we
 cannot give a reasonable Account of
 this, 'tis reasonable to conclude, that
 our Souls did not exist from Eternity,
 but were created immediately from
 Nothing by the Supreme or Eternal
 Being.

5. The last Proof shall be taken
 from the Principles of our Adversa-
 ries themselves.

'Tis well known, that they suppose
 the Universal Matter or the whole Sy-
 stem of the Materials of which the
 Universe consists to be the only Sub-
 stance, and to be not only without a
 Free

Free Principle of Action, but even ESSAY
 purely Passive in each of its sup- V.
 posable Parts; and consequently, 
 they must allow that Motion is but a
 mere Passion communicated from one
 Part or Portion of Matter to another
 in a continual Circulation. From
 hence I argue thus: If Matter (or the
 Materials of which the Visible Uni-
 verse consists) was the Onely Sub-
 stance and from Eternity, it was ei-
 ther at Rest from Eternity or in Mo-
 tion. If *at Rest*, it could never have
 begun to move without a Free Prin-
 ciple of Action; which is what our
 Adversaries are by no means inclin'd
 to allow it. If *in Motion*, then it can
 never cease to move. For if Motion
 was an eternal Attribute or Affection
 of Matter, it was and is an absolutely
 Necessary Attribute of Matter. But
 to say, that Passive Matter (as they
 themselves suppose it to be) ever had,
 and still has an absolutely Necessary
 Connection with Motion, is to con-
 found the Ideas and Natures of Things.
 For Passiveness includes no more in its
 Idea or Nature than a Capacity of be-
 ing either moved or at Rest indiffe-
 rently: Since what is entirely Passive
 is absolutely indifferent either to Mo-
 tion or Rest. But what was indiffe-
 rent to both, could have no Connec-
 tion

ESSAY tion with either. If therefore Mat-

V. ter was neither at Rest nor in Motion
 (according to their own Principles)
 from Eternity, it was not from Eternity,
 but began to Be, or was created by the
 Eternal Being.

S E C T. IV.

But Justice requires that we should consider the Objections that have been made.

Obj. 1. One great Objection against the Creation of a new Substance is taken from our Incapacity to form an Idea of the Manner of it.

But this Objection must needs vanish when we reflect that tho' an Existence without Cause and Beginning is the most demonstrable Thing in Nature, (for Something must have been Eternally or without Beginning) yet we are at least, as incapable of forming an Idea of an Existence without Beginning as of an Existence with Beginning.

Several other Instances of the Deficiency of our Ideas might be produced. A Man born blind hath all the Reason in the World to believe there is such a Thing as Sight, tho' for Want of Ideas he cannot conceive the Manner of it. And we all know that our Bodies are moved, tho' no Man can conceive by what Sort of Power

Power, and in what Manner the Motion is begun. These Instances clearly demonstrate that our Ideas or Conceptions, being sometimes deficient, are not always the Standards of the Truth of Things, and consequently, that it is very unreasonable to disbelieve a Thing of which we have sufficient rational Evidence, purely because we can form no Idea of the Manner of it.

Obj. 2. The *Spinofists* insist much upon it, That no Substance can create or produce any Thing which hath not formally or properly in itself whatever Attributes or Properties it is said to communicate to Others. Thus, say they, that which is entirely Impotent or Unintelligent cannot produce or communicate Power or Intelligence: And by Parity of Reason, that Being which hath no Proper Extension (or Amplitude at least) could not communicate Extension and Solidity to Matter.

I answer. 'Tis hard to conceive why any Man should make it a Difficulty to allow that the Creator of all things possesses all the Real Attributes which he communicated to Other Beings, as far as they imply Perfection. Who can deny that the Eternal Being hath the most Perfect Self-Motion, as
he

ESSAY he is most Perfectly Self-active? But

V. Internal Motion or Self-motion (tho' without Change of Place, which proceeds from Imperfection) might very well communicate Motion to the Visible Universe. And who can deny that His Substance is the most solid as well as the most Extensive, which is not only Impenetrable by any other, but which penetrates and contains all other Substance, being itself Unbounded by any thing? These Queries being duly consider'd, it will appear that this is no such formidable Objection as it seem'd to be.

Obj. 3. 'Tis further objected, that since the most Perfect Being could not fail to act in the most Perfect Manner, therefore it follows, that whatever He effected, both could not but Be, and could not be otherwise than it was: From whence it seems likewise to follow, that the Material Universe was Necessary or Eternal.

I answer. 'Tis confess'd that the most Perfect Being, in case he acted, could not but act in the most perfect Manner. Therefore He acted not Eternally or Necessarily with Regard to other Beings, but most Freely; because Freedom or Liberty of Action with Regard to other Beings, is a Perfection, and the Contrary would be

be a great Imperfection, as implying a Necessary Dependence on other Beings. But since the Most Perfect Being could not depend on any other Being, therefore, (contrary to the Inference made in the Objection) the Material Universe was not Necessary or Eternal.

Obj. 4. Again, the *Spinozists* argue thus. The most Perfect and Happy Being could Will nothing but Himself. For to suppose him to Will or Produce any Being, is to suppose what is inconsistent with the very Nature of Perfect Happiness; forasmuch as it is to suppose Him to want an Addition to His Happiness which was ever most Perfect.

I answer. The most Perfect Being could not but be naturally qualified for and disposed to Beneficence, as far as was consistent with the Perfection of Liberty. But His Acts of Beneficence, as they must be supposed to have been Free, so they must be supposed to have been exerted with a Direct View to the Happiness of Others, not with the least Reflex View to the Increase of His own Happiness, which could not but be ever most Perfect. Therefore the most Perfect and most Happy Being might Will Something besides Himself.

Obj.

ESSAY *Obj.* 5. In the last Place, 'tis objected; That to suppose that an Absolutely Infinite Being produced any other Being, is to suppose a Number beyond, or exceeding, an Absolutely Infinite Number: Which is Absurd or Contradictory.

I answer. This Argument for ought appears, may conclude against those who suppose the Nature of the Supreme Perfection to include an Absolute Infinity of Kinds and Degrees. For, on that Supposition, the Creation of any Real Kind or Degree of Perfection in a distinct Being, would, perhaps, be like reckoning beyond an Absolutely Infinite Number. But that Notion of the Supreme Perfection, as it seems to be ill-grounded and infinitely confused, so it has been, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, the Occasion of many other Errors besides those of *Spinoza*. But of this more has been said elsewhere. *

* See, *The Impartial Enquiry into the Existence and Nature of God*, Book II.

F I N I S.

